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Abstract
The International Court of Justice-the global system's oldest and
most venerable tribunal-has failed to meet its full potential. This is in
large measure due to the requirement that the Court may only assert juris-
diction over states with their consent, which is often withheld. To help
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correct for this failure, this article proposes that the Court be given a refer-
ral jurisdiction. Referral jurisdiction would empower the Court to issue
advisory opinions on interstate disputes without the requirement of state
consent. Standing in the way of nonconsent-based jurisdiction, however, is
the problem of the Gordian Knot: The world's most powerful countries who
are best able to lead or block expansion of the Court's jurisdiction have
historically perceived their advantage to lie more with political muscle than
expanded judicial process. Today, their power to block is manifest in the
ability of each of the permanent five members of the United Nations Secur-
ity Council to veto amendments to the treaty creating the Court. This arti-
cle, however, suggests that there is a solution to the Gordian Knot problem.
It proposes a legal strategy that would allow the United Nations General
Assembly to establish referral jurisdiction without a treaty amendment.
Having cut the Gordian Knot, this article goes on to make the case for
referral jurisdiction. Specifically, it argues that (1) the proposal for referral
jurisdiction is legal under the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, and other general principles of interna-
tional law; (2) referral jurisdiction would further compliance with interna-
tional law; and (3) its implementation would institutionally strengthen the
Court. This article concludes by suggesting that the rise of many newly
industrializing countries that may be willing to spearhead jurisdictional
expansion portends new possibilities for cutting the Gordian Knot and, in
the process, unleashing a promising era of global rule of law reform.
Alexander [the Great]. . . requested to see the [Gordian Knot], and, when it
was shown him, not being able to find the ends of the cords, which were hid-
den within the knots, he put a forced interpretation on the oracle, and cut the
cords with his sword; and thus, when the involutions were opened out,
discovered the ends concealed in them.
-Justin'
Introduction
Despite widespread agreement that reform of the global institutional
architecture is desirable, attaining it has been elusive. Typical of the unfor-
tunate demise of past reform efforts was Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
largely stymied project to spearhead a post-millennial transformation of
the United Nations.2 Similar recent defeats of initiatives to strengthen the
specialized regimes established to meet the apocalyptic threats of global
warming and nuclear weapons also stand as ominous reminders of the dif-
ficulties of reform.3 A key reason for the nonemergence of a more func-
1. JUSTIN, CORNELIUS NEPOS, AND EUTROPIUS 97 (John Shelby Watson trans., London,
Henry G. Bohn 1853).
2. See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security,
and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (laying out former
Secretary General Kofi Annan's post-millennial reform agenda).
3. See generally James Traub, At the World's Summit: How Will Leading Nations
Lead?, POL'Y ANALYSIS BRIEF (The Stanley Found., Muscatine, Iowa), June 2009, at 8-10,
available at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id-388 (discussing
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tional global system of governance has been ambivalence, or even hostility,
from the most powerful countries of the world, particularly the five perma-
nent members on the United Nations Security Council. While it would be
an oversimplification to lay complete responsibility for the general inertia
regarding reform at their feet, the reality is that powerful countries are gen-
erally best positioned to lead or block initiatives.
That the global powers-that-be would have a desultory record in lead-
ing the world toward a more functional system of global governance might
not have been apparent to an observer caught up in the inaugural optimism
of the post-World War II order. In the war's immediate aftermath, the
United States led the way toward the creation of a rule-based international
system. If biased in favor of the powerful, the new global institutions-the
United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Bretton Woods Insti-
tutions, and the GATT-also held the promise of potential evolution toward
an effective law-based international system. While powerful countries in
the period since the dawn of the Cold War have led certain global rule of
law advances, mostly in the area of trade, their commitment to the promise
has not been sustained. The one great exception was the creation of the
International Criminal Court. Even this innovation, however, despite
being promoted by leading members of the global community, had to over-
come both passive and active opposition from three of the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council. 4
The reasons why powerful countries have tended not to support
efforts to make the international legal system more effective are complex.
The weight of historical habit, the interests of elites, mistrust born of spe-
cific conflicts, and insular and other cultural attitudes have all played a
role. Of greatest importance, however, is the fact that the powerful domi-
nate the present global system and, consequently, do not tend to perceive
replacing that system with one that is more rule-based to be in their
interest.
This is the Gordian Knot of global rule of law reform. Those who
could most easily lead a transition to a more law-based international sys-
tem often see themselves as having the biggest stake in the current config-
uration of power. Developing strategies for cutting this Gordian Knot calls
for the attention of those who think about advancing international rule of
law. In this Article I will answer this call with a study of the International
Court of Justice, the international system's most venerable standing court
and the only one with a pedigree dating back to the League of Nations.
This Article is divided into two parts. Part One explains how the prob-
lem of the Gordian Knot has worked to frustrate the expansion of the
impediments to reform of the global climate change and nuclear weapons proliferation
regimes).
4. See ERIK K. LEONARD, THE ONSET OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS THEORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 95-100 (2005) (chronicling the
British and French support for the International Criminal Court, the American and Chi-
nese opposition to it, and the Russian decision to vote for, but not subsequently ratify,
the Rome Statute creating that court).
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Court's jurisdiction and concludes by proposing how the General Assem-
bly can cut that Knot to initiate what I call referral jurisdiction. Such juris-
diction would allow aggrieved states to seek the Court's advisory opinion
regarding their allegations against other states without the jurisdictional
consent of those states. Part Two of this Article shifts gears to make the
supporting legal and political case for referral jurisdiction. Because availa-
ble theory does not offer a distinct model for explaining how an incremen-
tal expansion of the Court's advisory jurisdiction would further
compliance with international law and strengthen the Court, this Part
presents such customized theory.
To develop these themes, in Section I of Part One, I describe the extent
to which the Court's jurisdiction is limited by the requirement of state con-
sent and how this limitation prevents the Court from living up to a judicial
potential unique among the international system's tribunals. In Section II,
I apply the Gordian Knot thesis to the problem of expanding the Court's
jurisdiction with a recounting of how the great powers have historically
thwarted the universalization of the Court's jurisdiction. As I will detail,
the great powers at the time of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice's founding after World War I opposed universalizing its jurisdiction,
just as they did the jurisdiction of its successor, the International Court of
Justice, after World War II. In both instances, the less powerful countries,
unable to cut the Gordian Knot, were forced to accede to the great powers.
During the Court's formative years, however, the great powers were not
challenged by the less powerful countries to acquiesce to jurisdictional
reform, as those from the developing world perceived the Court to be
neither adequately representative of their societies nor sensitive to their
perspectives.
Today, the Court again enjoys broad-based support among the less
powerful countries of the world. The timing is therefore opportune for
expanding its jurisdiction. To take advantage of this opportunity, a way
must be found to cut the Gordian Knot of what history suggests will be
opposition from the great powers. In Section III, I propose a way this can
be done. Namely, I will explain how the Knot, as currently configured, ties
up jurisdictional reform because each of the five permanent powers on the
United Nations Security Council may veto an amendment of the Court's
statute expanding its jurisdiction. There is a viable way, however, for the
United Nations General Assembly to bypass the Security Council and cre-
ate referral jurisdiction. As I will detail, the General Assembly can create a
Judicial Commission under Article 22 of the Charter, and under Article 96
it can empower that Commission to refer to the Court requests of aggrieved
states for advisory opinions.
In Section I of Part Two, I make the doctrinal case that my proposal for
referral jurisdiction is legal under the Charter of the United Nations, the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and other general principles of
international law. In Section II, I make the case that referral jurisdiction
would improve compliance generally with international law. To support
this contention, I employ three of the predominate descriptive theories of
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international law compliance (transnational legal process theory, Thomas
Franck's legitimacy theory, and rationalist compliance theory) to predict
the salutary effect that referral jurisdiction would have on international
law compliance. Finally, in Section III, I make the case that the response of
states to the Court's foray beyond the realm of consensual jurisdiction
would institutionally strengthen, rather than weaken, the Court.
Part One: The International Court of Justice and the Problem of the
Gordian Knot
I. The International Court of Justice, Its Importance, and
Jurisdictional Limitations
A. The Court and Its Unique Importance
In terms of status and hold on the public imagination, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is the closest institution that the international com-
munity has to a high court. With its membership universal and its
competence not limited to a particular subject area, the Court today hears
disputes involving both developed and developing countries from East and
West, North and South.5 The subject matter of its judgments transcends
conflicts traditionally deemed suitable for judicial settlement and includes
some of the global community's most contentious issues, such as the use of
force and self-defense, the legality of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing,
self-determination of peoples, environmental liability, human rights, and
genocide. 6
Yet the Court does not stand alone on the international judicial land-
scape. It now shares that panorama with a proliferation of specialized
international tribunals. For instance, Europe,7 the Americas," and Africa,9
all have human rights courts, which have been complimented by a plethora
of war crimes tribunals, the most important of which is the International
Criminal Court. 10 Various international tribunals have also come to play a
major role in resolving international trade disputes. The capstone of the
international trading system is the World Trade Organization's Dispute Set-
5. See International Court of Justice, List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946,
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (con-
taining a complete list of cases referred to the Court in its over half century of
existence).
6. Id.
7. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
8. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 33, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978).
9. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Estab-
lishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (111) (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004). This court is the
newest of the regional human rights courts. It delivered its first judgment in 2009.
10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3, 90 (entered into force Jul. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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tlement Body with its panels and Appellate Body. 1 ' In addition, several
regional trade courts are active. The jurisdiction of the European Union's
European Court of Justice extends to trade disputes and much more. 12 The
North American Free Trade Agreement establishes a range of tribunals to
deal with specific trade and other matters. 1 3 ASEAN, 1 4 the African
Union,' 5 and MERCOSUR 16 all have institutional machinery to settle trade
disputes. This machinery, at least to some extent, relies on adjudication,
as do many of the numerous bilateral free trade agreements between states.
Other international regimes, such as The Law of the Sea Treaty, have estab-
lished international tribunals to adjudicate disputes within their subject
matter areas.
1 7
While these specialized tribunals have an important place in the inter-
national judicial system, they are no substitute for the unique role played
by the International Court of Justice. Except within Europe, the specialized
tribunals are largely limited to adjudicating either trade or human rights/
criminal matters, and there is little prospect for the creation of courts with
alternative mandates. 18 Thus, for the foreseeable future, specialized inter-
national tribunals are unlikely to contribute to resolving conflicts in such
vital areas of global concern as security and the environment.
Moreover, the International Court of Justice is uniquely positioned to
bring coherence to what has developed into an ad hoc system of overlap-
ping tribunals. One reason jurisdictional boundaries of tribunals overlap
is that the mandates of the regimes they serve overlap. For example, the
United States, Mexico, and Canada are members of both NAFTA and the
11. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art.
2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
12. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 OJ. (C 306) 1 (entered into
force Dec. 1, 2009). The European Court of Justice's mandate is to interpret the law of
the European Union generally.
13. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1115-38 (Set-
tlement of Disputes Between a Party and an Investor of Another Party), 1901-11 (Dis-
pute Settlement in Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Matters), 2003-22 (Institutional
Agreements and Dispute Settlement Procedures), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 l.L.M. 289 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1994).
14. See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations arts. 22-27, opened for
signature Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf (entered into force Dec. 15, 2008).
15. See Constitutive Act of the African Union arts. 13-15, Jul. 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/23.15 (entered into force May 26, 2001), available at http://www.africa-union.
org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive Act en.htm#Article33.
16. See Treaty of Asunci6n [a.k.a. MERCOSUL/MERCOSUR] arts. 9-13, Mar. 26,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041.
17. See, e.g., Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, Dec.
9, 1984, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention-agree-
ments/texts/unclos/annex6.htm.
18. For a comprehensive listing of tribunals as well as compliance and oversight bod-
ies, see Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The Project on International
Courts and Tribunals: International Judiciary in Context, http://www.pict-pcti.org/publi-
cations/synoptic-chart/synopsc4.pdf.
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World Trade Organization, each of which independently oversees the regu-
lation of trade relations and has its own trade tribunals.
Lines of authority among tribunals of regimes with seemingly unre-
lated mandates can also overlap because the facts and law presented by
cases in the real world do not always conform to jurisdictional boundaries.
For example, the Dispute Resolution Body of the World Trade Organization
would have jurisdiction to hold that international trade law either allows or
disallows bans on the importation of foreign products manufactured in
ways that contribute disproportionately to global warming. 19 Though
promulgated by a trade tribunal, such a decision would obviously have
significant environmental implications.
Such jurisdictional overlap threatens the coherence of the interna-
tional judicial system because, as Cesare Romano has pointed out, it makes
it more likely that tribunals will inconsistently interpret the same interna-
tional norms.20 To the extent that specialized tribunals are to proliferate,
this incoherence will be aggravated. As the only court of general jurisdic-
tion, universal membership, and pedigree, and whose decisions are already
regarded as deserving of special deference by specialized tribunals,2 1 the
International Court of Justice is best positioned to settle the law in the face
of divergence among tribunals.
19. Tribunals of the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, have decided cases that
implicate the legality of environmental measures. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report,
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/
RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibition on Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); GATT Panel Report,
United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R Uune 16, 1994), BISD 39S/155,
unadopted; GATT Panel Report, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991), BISD 39S/155, unadopted. For a discussion specifically of the legality
under international trade law of an import ban on products manufactured in ways that
contribute disproportionately to global warming, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE
CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KiM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31-64
(2009), available at http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters-preview/4280/02iie
4280.pdf.
20. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
791, 798, 838-44 (2007) (providing examples of international tribunals inconsistently
interpreting norms and examples of the same disputes being litigated in multiple
forums). But see Jonathan Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple Interna-
tional Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 347 (1998) (concluding that while dan-
gers exist, the coherence of the international system does not appear to be significantly
threatened). For further discussion, see Symposium, The Proliferation of International
Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Tullio Treves, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice on
Questions Raised by Other International Tribunals, in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONs LAW 220-21 (Jochen A. Frowein & Ruidiger Wolfrum eds., 2000) (documenting
reliance on the Court's decisions by specialized tribunals); see also Address of H.E. Gil-
bert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 41st plen. mtg., at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/55/
PV.41 (Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/pv/a55p
v41.pdf [hereinafter Guillaume Address] (arguing that the Court is best positioned to
resolve conflicting interpretations of international law among specialized tribunals).
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B. A Potential Unrealized: The Court and Its jurisdictional Limits
Despite the Court's unique importance, it is not reaching its full
potential to contribute to improving the international legal system that we
will explore in Part 11. The most significant barrier to the Court fulfilling
this potential is its relatively limited availability. Notwithstanding a signifi-
cant increase in the Court's popularity over the past two decades, 22 more
often than not a state with a grievance against another state cannot get a
hearing before the Court because of restrictions on the Court's ability to
exercise jurisdiction.
The Court can only exercise binding jurisdiction over states that have
consented to jurisdiction. Under the "optional clause" of Article 36(2) of
its Statute, the Court can exercise so-called compulsory jurisdiction over a
respondent in a particular case only if that state has prospectively con-
sented to this jurisdiction. 2 3 To manifest such consent the state must have
submitted a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
for the kind of dispute being litigated.2 4 In addition, the applicant state
must also have accepted in its own declaration that, in accordance with the
rule of reciprocity, it would itself be subject to the Court's jurisdiction were
it to be sued in a case of a similar nature.2 5 In theory, the Article 36(2)
optional clause imbues the Court with the ability to exercise universal
jurisdiction, but in practice, roughly two-thirds of the world's countries do
not currently accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.2 6
Lacking the ability to assert compulsory jurisdiction, the Court can
exercise binding jurisdiction if the disputing parties agree ad hoc to refer a
matter to it, 2 7 or if the parties have a dispute under a treaty that provides
for dispute resolution by the Court.2 8 While countries do at times agree ad
hoc to submit to the Court's jurisdiction (particularly with regard to border
disputes) 2 9 and a number of treaties, especially older ones, contain provi-
22. One-third of the judgments handed down in the Court's sixty-year history have
been delivered in the past decade. See Address of H.E. Rosalyn Higgins, President of the
International Court of Justice, to the General Assembly of the United Nations 7 (Nov. 1,
2007), http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/7/14117.pdf.
23. Annex to the U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36,
para. 2, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
24. Id.
25. Id. For a more detailed explanation of how the rule of reciprocity has been inter-
preted by the Court to work in practice, see generally Edith Brown Weiss, Reciprocity and
the Optional Clause, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE AT A CROSSROADS 82 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).
26. As of May 2011, sixty-six countries have declarations recognizing the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of justice. See International Court of Justice,
List of Declarations Recognizing the Court's Jurisdiction as Compulsory, http://www.icj-cij.
org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3.
27. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 36, para. 1.
28. Id.
29. See International Court of Justice, supra note 5 (listing the cases that have been
referred to the Court). For a recent case involving a jointly submitted maritime bound-
ary dispute, see, e.g., Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and
South Ledge (Malay./Sing.), 2008 I.CJ. 12 (May 23).
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sions providing for dispute resolution by the Court,30 most disputing
countries do not go to the Court, and most treaties do not have provisions
for dispute resolution before the Court.3 1
Finally, despite the absence of explicit authority in the Court's Statute,
the Court has accepted jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum proro-
gatum. This doctrine holds that states can imply their consent to jurisdic-
tion by responsively pleading to claims against them without contesting
jurisdiction. Forum prorogatum, however, has only been the basis for juris-
diction on rare occasions. 3 2
Absent state consent, the only alternative for calling the Court into
service is by recourse to its advisory (i.e. nonbinding) jurisdiction. 33
States, however, cannot request advisory opinions. Only the United
Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, or other organs of the
United Nations or specialized agencies empowered by the General Assem-
bly to request advisory opinions have that ability.34 In theory, the General
Assembly or Security Council could request that the Court weigh in on
interstate disputes (often referred to by commentators as quasi-contentious
cases). In practice, however, because the internal political barriers to
Assembly or Council approval of such requests are formidable, 3 5 the Gen-
eral Assembly has only asked the Court to weigh in on interstate disputes
30. Presently 268 treaties provide for dispute resolution by the Court. The subject
matter prescribed by those treaties is varied, but among the most common kinds of
treaties are those related to friendship, commerce and navigation, air transport, and
consular relations. Many of these 268 treaties have so-called compromissory clauses
mandating dispute resolution by the Court; but the trend is towards providing that par-
ties may, as one among other alternatives, opt into having their treaty disputes resolved
by the Court. For a comprehensive listing of treaties that provide for dispute resolution
by the Court, see International Court of Justice, List of Treaties with Clauses Relating to
the Jurisdiction of the Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1
&p 3 =4 (last visited May 22, 2011).
31. The relatively limited number of treaties with compromissory clauses providing
for dispute resolution by the Court (see id.) is but a fraction of the tens of thousands of
treaties in force. See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, n.4 (5th ed. 2008)
(reporting that 44,499 treaties were registered with the United Nations as of 2007).
32. See, e.g., Haya de la Torre Case, 1951 I.C.J. 71, 78 (June 13).
33. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65.
34. Article 96, paragraph I of the United Nations Charter provides that "[tihe Gen-
eral Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on any legal question." Article 96, paragraph 2 provides that
"[o]ther organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time
be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities." U.N. Charter art.
96, paras. 1-2. Nineteen bodies are currently authorized by the General Assembly to
request advisory opinions. See International Court of Justice, Organs and Agencies of the
United Nations Authorized to Request Advisory Opinions, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdic-
tion/index.php?pl=5&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited May 22, 2011).
35. See, e.g., TERRY D. GILL, ROSENNE'S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT
WORKS 235 (6th ed. 2003) ("It is quite clear that the modern political organs encounter
great difficulties in mustering the majority to support a request for an advisory opinion,
especially as an incident in the settlement of a political dispute of which they are
seised.").
612 Vol. 44
2011 Cutting the Gordian Knot
on four occasions,3 6 and the Security Council has only made one such
request.3 7 Instead, the advisory process has primarily been used to clarify
matters of internal United Nations governance. 38
1I. Overcoming the Court's Limited Jurisdiction: The Difficulty of
Cutting the Gordian Knot
The limitations on the Court's jurisdiction did not come about by
accident. Rather, they are an example of the Gordian Knot phenomenon at
work. To understand the importance of this phenomenon for jurisdic-
tional reform, I will now turn to chronicling the great powers' history of
successfully thwarting efforts to universalize the Court's jurisdiction.
Drawing from this history, I conclude that the great powers will likely be
similarly predisposed to thwart such initiatives in the future.
A. The League of Nations and the Creation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice
1. The Creation of the Permanent Court
The International Court of Justice's history begins with the founding
of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice,3 9 as part
of the grand attempt to create a new global order following the horrors of
WorldWar I. Five of the six great powers of the day-Britain, France, Italy,
Japan, and most importantly, the United States (represented personally by
President Woodrow Wilson)-took the lead in negotiations at Versailles
over the shape of this order.40 Only the newly communist Russia was left
out of the planning.4 1 To be sure, significant differences of opinion
emerged within and between the powers over how to advance their ambi-
tious project, including the extent to which they should cede national
autonomy to the cause of effective governance. At the end of the day, how-
ever, notwithstanding the high-mindedness of individual statesmen, tradi-
36. See infra notes 149, 151-153 and accompanying text (identifying quasi-conten-
tious cases referred to the Court by the General Assembly). See infra notes 150,
152-153 (qualifying cases that do not technically involve two "states").
37. See infra note 150 (identifying the quasi-contentious case referred to the Court
by the Security Council and explaining why that case technically does not involve two
states).
38. See MICHLA POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN
THE LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 172 (1973) [hereinafter POMERANCE, ADVISORY FUNCTION]
(observing that interstate disputes have constituted a large proportion of the proposed
matters that the General Assembly has decided not to refer to the Court for advisory
opinions).
39. For a classic and comprehensive history of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, see generally MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUS-
TICE, 1920-1942: A TREATISE (1943).
40. For a chronicling of the negotiations, see generally MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS
1919: SIx MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2001) (focusing especially on the diplo-
matic interactions of the so-called big three: Woodrow Wilson of the United States, David
Lloyd George of Great Britain, and Georges Clemenceau of France).
41. See id. at 82.
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tional raison d'etat won out over any meaningful sacrifice of national
power.
For example, while the political heart of the new order, the League of
Nations, allowed every member a vote in an Assembly, a Council that
required unanimity on almost all matters of importance dominated as the
preserve of the great powers.42 In a similar vein, the League oversaw a
mandate system to provide a path toward self-determination for the colonial
territories of the war-defeated powers. The victorious powers, however,
maintained their empires, and, in some cases, expanded them at the
expense of the vanquished.43 For our purposes, the most important exam-
ple of the great powers' reluctance to cede national autonomy was their
refusal to accept a Permanent Court of International Justice that could
exercise nonconsent-based compulsory jurisdiction.
The story of the negotiations over this new court begins with the man-
date in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations that the League
Council formulate plans for a permanent international court.4 4 In Febru-
ary of 1920, the League Council assigned an independent committee of
legal experts, the Advisory Committee of Jurists, the task of drafting a
treaty for the Permanent Court.4 5 Perhaps taking its internationalist man-
date too much at face value, the Committee included compulsory jurisdic-
tion in its scheme for the Permanent Court.46
42. League of Nations Covenant arts. 3-5, 15. For further discussion, see generally
CHARLES HOWARD-ELLIS, THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE & WORKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
122-63 (1929).
43. See generally MACMILLAN, supra note 40, at 98-109.
44. Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that "[tihe Council
shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the
establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be compe-
tent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." League of Nations Covenant
art. 14. For a more detailed account of the negotiations for the Permanent Court, see
HUDSON, supra note 39, at 93-129. See also MICHAEL DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD COURT, 1920-1935, at 17-46 (1988) (detailing the role played by the United
States in the negotiations for the Permanent Court); Lorna Lloyd, "A Springboard for the
Future": A Historical Examination of Britain's Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 28 (1985) (focusing especially
on Britain's role in the negotiations over compulsory jurisdiction); Maria Vogiatzi, The
Historical Evolution of the Optional Clause, 2 NoN-ST. ACTORS & INT'L L. 41, 46-72
(2002) (recounting the dynamics of the Permanent Court negotiations specifically over
compulsory jurisdiction).
45. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Extract From the Proces-Verbal of the Fourth Meeting of the
Second Session of the Council of the League of Nations, in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE
ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 14 or THE
COVENANT AND THE ADOPTION BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT
8, 11 (1921) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL]
(reporting on the approval of the formation of the Advisory Committee and of its
membership).
46. Before the final vote on the draft statute as a whole, one member of the Commit-
tee, Mineichiro Adatci ofJapan, stated for the record his opposition to compulsory juris-
diction, yet he joined with his colleagues in unanimously approving the draft statute.
See PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, 31st
Meeting (Private), Held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, on July 22nd, 1920, in PROCLS-
Vol. 44
2011 Cutting the Gordian Knot
Upon receiving the Committee's draft Statute for the Permanent
Court, the four great powers holding permanent seats on the League Coun-
cil-Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan-all opposed its provisions for
compulsory jurisdiction. 4 7 They were firm in their determination to main-
tain the autonomy that had been associated with the traditional voluntary
nature of arbitration. Under their sway, the Council oversaw the substitu-
tion of amendments that eliminated compulsory jurisdiction and then
referred the amended draft to the League Assembly for consideration in its
first session. 48
The stage was set for a confrontation in the Assembly between many
of the less powerful countries who perceived compulsory jurisdiction as a
legal counterweight to military and economic might and the great powers
unwilling to circumscribe an arena of advantage. The Assembly delegated
consideration of the draft Statute to the Third (Legal and Constitutional)
Committee, which, in turn, charged a small subcommittee with working
out a recommendation to be considered by the Assembly plenary. 49
Steadfast in their opposition to compulsory jurisdiction and willing to hold
ratification of the Statute hostage to its defeat, the powers, in subcommit-
tee deliberations, would agree only to the Optional Clause allowing for
countries to submit to compulsory jurisdiction voluntarily. 50
In December 1920, the debate moved to the Assembly plenary, where
the less powerful countries made clear in speech after speech their strong
support for compulsory jurisdiction.5 1 The powers' refusal to yield and the
need for their agreement forced the less powerful countries to reluctantly
accept that the fight for compulsory jurisdiction was lost. 52 Henri Lafon-
taine of Belgium expressed the frustrations of many when he declared
resentfully that "a minority of delegations has once more paralysed the will
VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, JUNE 16TH-JULY 24TH 1920, WITH
ANNEXES 645, 651-52 (1920) (documenting the Committee vote approving the Perma-
nent Court draft statute).
47. See Lloyd, supra note 44, at 37-38 (discussing the opposition of Britain, Italy,
and Japan to compulsory jurisdiction); Vogiatzi, supra note 44, at 60-63 (discussing
French opposition to compulsory jurisdiction).
48. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Report Presented by the French Representative, M. Leon Bour-
geois and Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at its Meeting at Brussels on
October 27th, 1920, in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL, supra
note 45, at 45-48.
49. See generally PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, Minutes of the Third
Committee, Third Meeting, Held on November 24th, 1920, at 4 p.m., in LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
THE RECORDS OF THE FIRST ASSEMBLY, MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEES 1, at 284, 284-90
(1920) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FIRST ASSEMBLY].
50. PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, Annex 14, in RECORDS OF THE FIRST
ASSEMBLY, supra note 49, at 313; PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, Annex 16a,
in RECORDS OF THE FIRST ASSEMBLY, supra note 49, at 566, 576. For further explanation of
the Optional Clause, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
51. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, First Assembly, Twentieth Plenary Meeting, Monday,
December 13th, 1920, at 10 a.m., in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE
COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 225-38.
52. Id. at 232; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, First Assembly, Twenty-First Plenary Meeting, Mon-
day, December 13th, 1920, at 4 p.m., in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY
THE COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 240-66 (1921).
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of the majority."'53 The Statute, without compulsory jurisdiction, was then
opened for state signature on December 16, 1920, and went into force on
September 1, 1921.5
4
A system allowing states to petition the Court for advisory opinions
without the consent of respondent states (similar to what this article will
propose) might have been promoted as a more generally acceptable alterna-
tive to compulsory jurisdiction. Such a proposal, however, did not receive
any serious consideration at the time. 55 In fact, while the Covenant's Arti-
cle 14 mandate specifically provided that the Permanent Court be able to
"give an advisory opinion on any dispute or question referred to it by the
Council or the Assembly," 5 6 the Third Committee excised implementing
language in the Advisory Committee's draft before referring it to the
League Assembly.57 Consequently, until the parties amended the Statute
in 1939, the Permanent Court was forced to improvise a mechanism in its
own rules for implementing Article 14's advisory mandate. 58
2. The Soviet Union and the United States
Even this great power-driven voluntarist system of jurisdiction was
ultimately considered too much of an infringement upon autonomy for the
two powers that never acceded to the Permanent Court Statute: the Soviet
Union and the United States. As the newly communist odd-person-out
among the powers, the Soviet Union did not join the League of Nations
until 193459 and never considered joining the Permanent Court.
For its part, the United States Senate famously rejected membership in
the League of Nations in 1920. This rejection was mainly over concerns
about sovereignty and that American power was inadequately reflected in
the League structure. 60 Encouraged on by both Democratic and Republi-
53. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, First Assembly, Twentieth Plenary Meeting, Monday, Decem-
ber 13th, 1920, at 10 a.m., in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUN-
CIL, supra note 45, at 232.
54. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 13, 1920, 1926
P.C.I.J. (set. D) No. 1.
55. But see MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-2005, at 32 n.140 (2006) (reporting that Argentina and the
International Labour Organization made proposals providing for states to agree mutually
to submit their disputes to the advisory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court).
56. League of Nations Covenant art. 14. For the full text of Article 14, see supra note
44.
57. See POMERANCE, ADVISORY FUNCTION, supra note 38, at 10-14 (discussing the cir-
cumstances surrounding the elimination of the Advisory Committee of Jurists' draft pro-
visions regarding advisory jurisdiction).
58. See Statute and Rules of Court, 1940 P.C.IJ. (set. D.) No.1 (4th ed.), at 27-28,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieD/D 01 4e edition.pdf (containing the
addition of Chapter IV governing Advisory Opinions).
59. The Soviet Union was subsequently expelled from the League in 1939 in
response to its invasion of Finland. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 107th Session of the Council,
Second Meeting, Held on Thursday, December 14th, 1939, at 4 p.m., in 20 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 506-08 (1939).
60. See generally THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE
QUEST FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 246-70 (1992) (detailing the history of the Senate
battle for ratification of the League Covenant).
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can pro-court forces, however, the United States long considered separately
joining the Permanent Court.6 1 Since the United States did not intend to
accept optional clause jurisdiction, 62 it would only be subject to binding
judgments that it consented to. Thus, the long and acrimonious debate
over Senate ratification came to center on advisory opinions, which could
be triggered by international referral of the League Council or Assembly.
To eliminate the potential that such advisory opinions might be rendered
over U.S. objections, the Senate added the so-called fifth reservation6 3 to its
January 1926 resolution of accession.
By providing in part that the Permanent Court could not "without the
consent of the United States entertain any request for an advisory opinion
touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims
an interest,"64 the U.S. was asserting a unilateral right to veto any request
for an advisory opinion that in its own judgment might impact upon its
interests. When the Conference of Signatories to the Statute met in Sep-
tember 1926, the Conference decided that the United States should be
offered the same rights to vote on advisory requests as members of the
Council or the Assembly but that it should not be granted exceptional pow-
ers.65 In November, President Coolidge responded to the Conference deci-
sion by refusing to send the treaty back to the Senate with a request for
modification.66 Despite then elder statesman Elihu Root's admirable efforts
beginning in 1929 to work out a compromise, ascendant America's great
power impulses were simply too strong. Accession to the Permanent Court
died its final death in the Senate in 1935.67
61. See MIcHIA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT AS A 'SUPREME
COURT OF THE NATIONS': DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND DISILLUSION 84 (1996) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS].
62. See id. at 80-81 (recounting U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's deci-
sion to rule out acceptance of optional clause jurisdiction).
63. See SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS, supra note 61, at 101-02. The fifth reserva-
tion was in addition to four fairly unnoteworthy reservations that Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes had previously drafted and submitted to the Senate. See id. at 80.
64. 67 CONG. REC. 2,656-57 (1926). The full text of the fifth reservation required as
conditions of U.S. accession, "[tlhat the Court shall not render any advisory opinion
except publicly after due notice to all States adhering to the Court and to all interested
states and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned;
nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advi-
sory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims
an interest." Id.
65. Minutes of the Conference of States Signatories of the Protocol of Signature of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, League of Nations Doc. V. Legal 1926. V. 26, at
77. The Assembly never requested an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court. By the
time of the Conference, the Council had requested thirteen opinions, always doing so by
a unanimous vote. To the extent that the Permanent Court would not render an advisory
opinion absent such unanimity, the Conference's offer of equal treatment gave the
United States its sought-for ability to veto a request for an advisory opinion. The prob-
lem from the United States' point of view was that the practice of unanimity was not
clearly the result of a legal requirement and could possibly be dispensed with. For fur-
ther related discussion, see infra notes 145-191 and accompanying text.
66. SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS, supra note 61, at 107.
67. For a description of Root's efforts and the final defeat of accession in the U.S.
Senate, see id. at 108-32.
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B. The United Nations and the Creation of the International Court of
Justice
Following the ruins of the Second World War, the United States came
of age as the world's undisputed superpower, and the Soviet Union
emerged as a geopolitical colossus in its own right. The jurisdictional Gor-
dian Knot problem played out again in the desire of each to ensure that
visionary plans for a new world order did not materially impinge upon its
national powers. In particular, internationalist presidents Franklin
Roosevelt and Harry Truman promoted the United Nations as a more mus-
cular version of the League of Nations.6 8 But in doing so, these men and
their fellow American post-war planners were careful not to compromise
the United States' own prerogatives as a great power. For example, the
Security Council of the new United Nations was to have a much greater
ability than the League Council to enforce the law against countries endan-
gering international peace and security, but the United States would have a
veto on that Council. 69
That this was non-negotiable was made graphically clear at the final
U.N. negotiating conference in San Francisco. There, delegate and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chair Tom Connally responded to represent-
atives of less powerful nations opposing the veto by tearing up the draft
United Nations Charter and proclaiming, "[y]ou may go home from San
Francisco, if you wish, and report that you have defeated the veto.... But
you can also say, 'We tore up the charter."' 70 The Soviet Union, as the
other emerging superpower, also made clear that the nonexistence of a veto
was a deal breaker.7 1
In negotiations over the institution that would succeed the Permanent
Court, the issue of compulsory jurisdiction again emerged as a major
source of contention. The four attending powers at the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference in 1944 (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and China) agreed that a Committee of Jurists would prepare a draft
statute for what was to become the International Court of Justice. 72 Unlike
the autonomous Committee of Jurists that had self-confidently proffered a
court with compulsory jurisdiction in 1920, the new Committee of Jurists
was to be a more closely controlled panel of government representatives. 73
And the United States, as the most powerful country, ensured its own spe-
68. For a very good recounting of how Roosevelt and Truman advanced the United
Nations project, see generally STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING
OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2003).
69. Pursuant to Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council may veto non-procedural matters. U.N. Charter art. 27,
para. 3.
70. See STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 18-19 (1995).
71. In fact, the Soviet Union took the ultimately unsuccessful position that even the
determination of whether to place a dispute on the Security Council's agenda for discus-
sion should be subject to the veto. See id. at 10-18.
72. ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR SECURITY 116 (1990).
73. Id.
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cial influence over the Committee by securing the chairmanship for the
American representative, State Department Legal Advisor Green
Hackworth.
74
All of the countries intended to be original signatories to the United
Nations Charter and Court Statute were represented on the Committee.
The diplomatic battles within the Committee largely picked up where they
had left off in the 1920s, with the less powerful states again advocating for
compulsory jurisdiction. This time, it was the two most powerful post-war
countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, who saw themselves as
having the greatest stake in staving off a transition to universal compulsory
jurisdiction. 75
Faced in the Committee with the unyielding demands of the less pow-
erful countries, Hackworth tried to persuade them to relent by proclaiming
with a pretense of disinterest that the opposition of the Soviet Union could
imperil the success of the negotiations. 76 Unable to derail compulsory
jurisdiction then and there, he maneuvered to defer the issue to the poten-
tially more congenial San Francisco Conference where draft language
allowing alternatively for compulsory jurisdiction or a continuation of the
optional clause would be presented. 77 At San Francisco, the United States
and the Soviet Union ultimately prevailed. They did so, however, only by
taking full responsibility for their positions and warning that the Court
project depended upon rejection of compulsory jurisdiction. 78
The United States and the Soviet Union were more conciliatory on the
issue of advisory jurisdiction. Although the United States in particular had
initially argued for denying the General Assembly the power possessed by
the League Assembly to request advisory opinions, it eventually relented
and even reluctantly agreed 7 9 to empower the General Assembly to author-
ize other organs of the United Nations to request such opinions.8 0
C. The International Court of Justice and the Failure of Past
Jurisdictional Reform Initiatives
The vision of a Court with expanded jurisdiction did not disappear
with its inception. Rather, jurisdictional proposals and initiatives contin-
ued for many years after. In particular, various Secretaries-General made
the case repeatedly that the General Assembly should use its Article 96(2)
74. See id.
75. Id. at 120.
76. See SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS, supra note 61, at 157.
77. Id. at 156.
78. Id. at 158-65.
79. See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 55, at 29-30. The United States did, however, manage
to derail an additional proposal to allow disputing states to agree to request advisory
opinions. Fifteenth Meeting of Committee IV/1, Doc. 701, 13 U.N. CONF. Doc. 235
(1945); see also ALJAGHOUB, supra note 55, at 32 (reporting on Britain's suggestion at the
San Francisco conference that disputing states be allowed to jointly request advisory
opinions and Belgium's proposal that states be able to unilaterally request advisory
opinions with the support of the Security Council).
80. See supra note 34 and accompanying text discussing the authority to request
advisory opinions under Article 96 of the United Nations Charter.
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powers to authorize the Secretary-General to request advisory opinions.8 1
States, non-governmental organizations, and scholars proposed other ideas
for expanding the advisory jurisdiction of the Court by way of either
amending the Court's Statute, expanding Article 96(2) authorizations,
promulgating new dispute resolution treaties, or establishing a committee
of the General Assembly similar to the Judicial Commission that will be
proposed in the next section of this Article. 82 For example, some sug-
gested that public international and regional organizations (in addition to
the specialized U.N. agencies authorized pursuant to Article 96 paragraph
2)83 be empowered to request advisory opinions.8 4 Proposals that states
81. In 1950 the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, concluded in a report that the General
Assembly could not legally authorize the new Human Rights Committee to request advi-
sory opinions from the Court. He instead suggested that the Secretary-General should
be so authorized. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, cl 19, U.N. Doc. E/1732 (June 26,
1950). In 1955, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj6ld renewed the suggestion that the
Secretary-General be empowered to request advisory opinions. See The Secretary-Gen-
eral, Working Paper: Judicial Review of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judg-
ments, U.N. Doc. A/AC.78/L.1 and Corr.1 (Mar. 22, 1955). In 1992, Secretary-General
Dr. Boutros-Ghali in his major reform proposal, Agenda for Peace, also recommended
that the Secretary-General be authorized to request advisory opinions. The Secretary-
General, An Agenda for Peace, 19, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (June 17, 1992). The
General Assembly took no position on the Secretary-General's proposal that he be
authorized to request advisory opinions. See G.A. Res. 47/120, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/120
(Feb. 10, 1993). For further discussion, see GILL, supra note 35, at 23; Stephen Schwe-
bel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions
of the International Court of Justice, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 869 (1984).
82. See, e.g., CLARENCE WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION 160-61 (1964); Lucius C. Caflisch, Reference Procedures and the International Court
of Justice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 572 (Leo Gross ed.,
1976); Paul Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in 2 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra, at 499, 524-28.
83. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the General Assembly's
Article 96(2) authority to empower organs of the United Nations and specialized agen-
cies to request advisory opinions).
84. Distinguished associations of international lawyers proposed that such organiza-
tions be empowered to request advisory opinions. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT DUBROVNIK, at viii (1956); Resolu-
tion of the Institute of International Law, reprinted in Manley 0. Hudson, The Thirty-
Third Year of the World Court, 49 AM J. INT'L L. 1, 14-16 (1955); see also Report on Steps
that Might be Taken by the General Assembly to Enhance the Effectiveness of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, in REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION 142, 156-58 (1971-72). The United States Senate also
approved a resolution on the Court that included a provision endorsing the empower-
ment of regional organizations to request advisory opinions. See S. Res. 76, 93d Cong.
(1974) [hereinafter Senate Resolution 76]. Several countries also voiced support for the
idea in response to a 1970 General Assembly Resolution inviting states to submit their
views of the role of the Court. See The Secretary-General, Review of the Role of the Inter-
national Court ofJustice, '1 90-101, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/8382
(Sept. 15, 1971) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report]; see also Special Comm. on the
Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Report of
the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the
Role of the Organization, 1 97, U.N. Doc. A/32/33 (1977). For further discussion by
commentators, see Heribert Golsong, Role and Functioning of the International Court of
Justice: Proposals Recently Made on the Subject, in 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 673, 681-82 (1971); Leo Gross, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the Interna-
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with disputes be given the option to jointly submit their disputes to the
Court for advisory opinions8 5 and proposals that national courts8 6 and
other international tribunals8 7 be allowed to submit questions of interna-
tional law to the Court for advisory opinions also gained a measure of cur-
rency. So did two proposals by Professor Louis Sohn for expanding the
ability of the Court to exercise compulsory jurisdiction. The first of Profes-
sor Sohn's proposals was that willing countries enter into special dispute
resolution treaties. These treaties would oblige them to accept the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court for agreed upon classes of disputes.88 The
second was that willing countries enter into a treaty accepting as binding
Security Council and General Assembly recommendations to adjudicate
specific classes of cases before the Court.89
Despite their abundance and variety, all of these jurisdictional initia-
tives were doomed to failure during the Court's formative period as a result
of a political dynamic more nuanced than the previous great power diktats.
Resistance from the western powers was, in fact, tempered by their percep-
tion that the Court was a useful Cold War ally.90 While it seems unlikely
that the most powerful of the western countries could have actually
tional Legal Order, in t THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 22, 43 (Leo
Gross ed., 1976); Szasz, supra note 82, at 514-16.
85. See, e.g., Senate Resolution 76, supra note 84; Szasz, supra note 82, at 516-19.
86. The proposal that national courts be allowed to submit questions of interna-
tional law to the Court for advisory opinions enjoyed brief currency in the United States,
garnering the support of the American Bar Association. See Proceedings of the 1982 Mid-
year Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 273, 277 (1982). In addi-
tion, the United States House of Representatives even approved a resolution asking the
President to explore the feasibility of the proposal. See H.R. Con. Res. 86, 97th Cong.
(1982). The proposal also enjoyed considerable support among members of the Court
and other leading international lawyers of the day. See, e.g.,JENKS, supra note 82, at 161,
166-68; PHILIP C. JEssUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 67-71 (1971); Leo Gross,
The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in
the International Legal Order, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 253, 308-13 (1971); Stephen Schwebel,
Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts,
28 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1988); Louis B. Sohn, Comment, Broadening the Advisory Jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1983). For a skeptical
view of the proposal, see Caflisch, supra note 82, at 572-609; Shabtai Rosenne, Prelimi-
nary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts: A
Reply, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1989).
87. For example, presidents of the Court endorsed the idea of allowing other inter-
national tribunals to submit advisory questions to the Court in their annual addresses to
the General Assembly. See Address by H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the
International Court of Justice, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 39th plen. mtg. at 1, 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.39 (Oct. 26, 1999),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/862/45/PDF/N9986
245.pdf?OpenElement; Guillaume Address, supra note 21. But see Treves, supra note 21,
at 225-231 (critiquing President Schwebel's proposal that the Court resolve conflicts
among international tribunals as unnecessary and likely to become politicized).
88. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE
HELD AT TOKYO 84-87 (1964).
89. Id. at 92-95.
90. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 111 (Stefan Voigt, Max Albert, Dieter Schimidtchen eds.,
2006) (ascribing the perception of the Court as sympathetic to the West's interests to the
composition of the Court's bench).
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brought themselves to acquiesce to jurisdictional reform, we will never
know definitively because the question was never forced by the less power-
ful countries.
This is largely because many in the developing world felt that the
Court's composition did not adequately represent the planet's non-western
social systems and that much of the law applied by the Court was a relic of
the colonial past.9 1 These perceptions were powerfully reinforced in the
minds of many by the Court's 1966 South West Africa, Second Phase deci-
sion.92 Having been years in the offing and the subject of unusual atten-
tion, the Court's decision that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have proper
standing to challenge South Africa's racist rule of what is today Namibia
was regarded by many as symbolic of the Court's lack of regard for the non-
western world.93
The composition of the Court's judges, however, gradually came to
more accurately reflect the diversity of the world's peoples. 94 This led to
corresponding changes in style, jurisprudence, and ultimately perceptions
of the Court. The culmination was the 1984 Nicaragua decision that, in
holding the United States liable for illegally using force, 95 signaled the
passing of an era that in the words of Thomas Franck was "mourned by
some, celebrated by others, but doubted by none."9 6
Today, most of the world's countries have come to perceive themselves
as having a stake in a Court that is now truly planetary, and if the history
of the founding of the two courts is a guide, many of these countries will be
predisposed to look with favor upon a proposal to universalize the Court's
advisory jurisdiction.9 7 Broken out in detail, a core of sixty-six coun-
tries, 98 over one-third of the total, already accept the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court and would likely see themselves as standing mostly to
gain from extending the Court's advisory jurisdiction to all countries. But-
tressing this base, approximately seventy-two percent of the countries of
91. Such perceptions were revealed, for example, in the General Assembly's 1972
Special Committee on Friendly Relations' deliberations over whether to recommend
expansion of the Court's jurisdiction. See generally Gross, supra note 84, at 22-23; see
also Secretary-General's Report, supra note 84, TI 42-68 (summarizing the views of
states on the reasons for their disinclination to resort to the Court).
92. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), Second Phase, Judgment,
1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18).
93. See Andronico 0. Adede, judicial Settlement in Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 47, 51 (A.S. Muller et al. eds.,
1997).
94. See International Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.
php?pl=1&p2=2&p3=2&PPSESSID=2bbd6d465eacd6692712aOb986815lcd (last vis-
ited May 27, 2011) (listing current and former judges with nationalities).
95. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 Uune 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua]. For further discussion of the Nicaragua case and its implica-
tions for the Court, see infra notes 238-246 and accompanying text.
96. Thomas Franck, Reviving the World Court, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1391, 1393 (1988)
(book review).
97. See GILL, supra note 35, at 236-37 (describing the extent to which countries
around the world have been participating in litigation before the Court).
98. See supra note 26.
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the world are small-to-midsized developing countries with a tendency to
perceive themselves as vulnerable to the political caprice of the powerful. 9 9
Finally, many small and midsized developed countries also feel a similar
vulnerability and, as at the founding of the two courts, they would likely
again view an expansion of the Court's realm of law as consistent with
their interests.
Paradoxically, now that the political potential for reform is present, the
initiatives are not. Ironically, the very popularity of the Court and its cor-
responding increase in caseload has made its supporters less concerned
with manufacturing business for it. 10 0 Instead, the imagination of the
international community has been captured by what had previously
seemed the more attainable alternative of establishing specialized tribu-
nals. 1 1 As the historical review suggests, however, the present is an oppor-
tune time to redirect our attention to defining a proposal that can cut the
Gordian Knot, and it is to that task that I will now turn.
IL. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Proposal for Referral Jurisdiction
On first blush, even with the support of the less powerful countries,
the same Gordian Knot problem that worked to defeat the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court after World War I and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice after World War II would appear to doom present
day efforts to grant states universal access to the Court's jurisdiction. Cer-
tainly, the rules for amending the Court Statute do not give cause for opti-
mism. Article 69 of that Statute incorporates by reference the amendment
provisions of Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter. 10 2 In
addition to requiring approval by two-thirds of the United Nations General
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations,10 3 these articles provide that a proposed amendment can be
vetoed by any one of the permanent five members on the Security Coun-
cil. 10 4 As with the powers in the past, most of the permanent members of
99. Of the 193 countries in the United Nations, 139 are identified by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund as having "developing economies." See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 184 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem. Nine
members of the United Nations are not included in the International Monetary Fund's
classification.
100. See, e.g., Treves, supra note 21, at 219 (observing that because the Court has
recently been particularly busy, "[t]he need for more cases does not seem to be as vital
anymore," and that "[tihis explains why proposals for entrusting to the Court a task in
solving problems in international law arising before domestic courts have been almost
forgotten.").
101. See, e.g., supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text (identifying a number of the
specialized international tribunals that now exist).
102. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 69.
103. U.N. Charter arts. 108-09. Article 108 provides for amendment of the Charter
without the convening of a conference. Article 109 provides that a Charter review con-
ference can be called into session by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and an
affirmative vote of any nine members of the fifteen-member Security Council.
104. Id.
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the Council are unlikely to support expanding the Court's jurisdiction, and
almost certainly at least one would cast a dissenting veto. Any hope that
proclivities might now be different is tempered by the fact that presently all
of the permanent members (except for Great Britain) are declining to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the optional
clause.10 5
Once again, it would seem that those powerful countries most predis-
posed to perceive their prerogatives of power as circumscribed by the
universalization of the Court's jurisdiction are also best positioned to block
a universalization initiative. But what if there was a legally valid way for
the General Assembly to universalize the Court's advisory jurisdiction
without the need to amend the Court's statute? In the General Assembly
today, after all, each of the 193 United Nations members have an equal
vote. 10 6 Consequently, the overwhelming majority of countries that are
not among the power elite predominate. A discerning reading of the
United Nations Charter reveals that the General Assembly by either a
majority or two-thirds vote10 7 does, in fact, have the power to vest the
Court with what I am calling referral jurisdiction over interstate disputes.
The Assembly has the authority to establish a Judicial Commission, which
could request advisory opinions on behalf of aggrieved states.10 8 That
authority derives from the combined force of two articles of the United
Nations Charter. The first is Article 22, which authorizes the Assembly to
establish subsidiary organs "as it deems necessary for the performance of
105. France withdrew from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction following the Court's
indication of provisional measures in the Nuclear Test Case. See Jean Charpentier, Pra-
tique Franaise Concernant du Droit International, 20 ANNUA1RE F A iSas DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 1027, 1051 (1974). The United States likewise withdrew after the Court
ruled that it had jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case. See Letter from George P. Schultz,
Secretary of State of the United States of America, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985). The
acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by the Chinese nationalist regime was
repudiated by the communist government in 1972. See U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
No. 5 at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9005 (1973). Russia never accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court. For reference to the listing of countries accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court, see supra note 26.
106. See U.N. Charter art. 9, para. 1, art. 18, para. 1. See also United Nations, Func-
tions and Powers of the General Assembly of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/
ga/about/background.shtml.
107. The requisite vote depends upon whether, under Article 18 of the United
Nations Charter, establishment of the to-be-proposed Judicial Commission should be
regarded as an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote, as opposed to a major-
ity vote, of the Assembly. While Article 18 identifies certain voting matters as important
questions, the Assembly can also decide (by majority vote) to consider other questions
to be important questions. See U.N. Charter art. 18, paras. 2-3. There is, however, little
precedent as to which other questions generally qualify. In particular, the requisite vote
required to establish Article 22 subsidiary organs is unclear since most have been
approved by consensus. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 429
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Simma].
108. For past works discussing the establishment of a committee as a vehicle for refer-
ring cases to the Court, see supra note 82.
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its functions." 10 9 The second is Article 96(2), which, as previously dis-
cussed, provides that the Assembly may empower organs of the United
Nations to "request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions that
arise within the scope of their activities."' 1 0 The Court has held that Arti-
cle 96 limits the questions organs can ask of it to those clearly within their
programmatic mandates. 11 However, as will be discussed in detail in Part
Two, Section I.A, if the programmatic mandate of the organ created under
Article 22 is precisely to request advisory opinions on behalf of states, the
organ may request opinions on questions put to it by states on any other-
wise justiciable legal disputes without a subject matter limitation.
In creating the Judicial Commission, the Assembly should provide that
it be carefully tailored to accomplish its referral mission. The Assembly
should make the Judicial Commission structurally independent and pre-
scribe that it be staffed by international law experts. In cases where Article
36 jurisdiction exists, 1 2 states would have the ability to choose between
initiating a contentious action, which would be binding, or a referral
action, which would be advisory. Any state wishing to pursue a referral
action would petition the Judicial Commission, and, upon criteria of jus-
ticiability and standing established by the General Assembly, the Judicial
Commission would refer the action to the Court for an advisory opin-
ion.1 1 3 So as not to overtax its political or material resources, the Court
could establish its own additional criteria for hearing disputes. Further,
the Court could exercise its discretion under Article 65 of its Statute not to
hear a dispute that it felt would challenge its institutional capacity to play a
constructive role. 114 In particular, so as to respond to the greatest needs
and promote coherence in the international system, the Court could accept
109. U.N. Charter art. 22 ("The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.").
110. See supra note 34.
111. See Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Con-
flict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 76-77 Uuly 8) (finding that the World Health
Organization was not authorized to request an advisory opinion on the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons because the subject matter was not "within the scope of [the]
activities" of the organization).
112. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
113. Before the 1998 addition of Protocol 11 to the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Convention provided for a
similar kind of referral system, whereby petitioners would file complaints with the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission would determine whether to
refer the matter to the European Court of Human Rights. For further discussion, see
Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 95, 99-105 (2003).
114. Article 65 of the Court's Statute provides that "[tihe Court may give an advisory
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request." ICJ
Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. The first reference to the word "may" in Article 65 has
always been interpreted to mean that the Court has the discretion not to comply with a
request for an advisory opinion. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 L.CJ 15, 19 (May
28); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory
Opinion, 1950 I.CJ. 65, 71-72 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties].
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cases specifically for which either no other international forum was availa-
ble or multiple forums had come to inconsistent conclusions.
In order to coherently integrate this expansion of the Court's ambit
into the structure of the international system, the Security Council could
play a gatekeeper role. The Council has primary responsibility for interna-
tional peace and security under the United Nations Charter. 1 15 As such, it
could be permitted to intercede to secure a deferral of the Judicial Commis-
sion's referral. This would help fulfill the U.N. Charter's vision of the
Security Council and Court working in tandem as provided, for example,
in the Article 36(3) exhortation that when recommending dispute resolu-
tion methods, the Security Council should as a general rule refer disputing
parties to the International Court of Justice, 1 6 and the Article 94(2) provi-
sion for the Security Council to enforce opinions of the Court.1 17
This scheme, on the one hand, gives the Council the flexibility to defer
cases when their going forward would be unhelpful to its own efforts or
might otherwise interfere with the political resolution of a conflict. On the
other hand, this plan also gives the Council the ability to use the Court's
opinions to buttress its legally principled positions or, if necessary, to seek
institutional cover by deferring to the rulings of the more politically insu-
lated Court. While allowing for political interference in the international
judicial system does not accord with our accepted understanding of blind
justice, it does accord with the practical realities of an international system
that is not yet capable of wholly grounding the judicial process in the inde-
pendent application of law.
This scheme giving the Security Council the ability to delay cases is
analogous to the Security Council deferral mechanism created by the par-
ties to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.1 18
Of critical importance to the integrity of this system is that the procedure
does not allow permanent members to suspend cases, including those
involving review of their own actions, without the requisite supermajority
vote of nine of the fifteen members of the Council. 119 This is because a
resolution of the Council would be necessary to delay a case, and a veto
can only block a resolution, not affirmatively secure its passage. 120
115. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
116. U.N. Charter art. 36, para. 3.
117. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
118. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that "[n]o investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or proceeded with under the Statute for a period of 12 months after
the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by
the Council under the same conditions." Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 16. For fur-
ther discussion, see Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 95, 103 (2006) (considering the extent to which the Security Council
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute has the authority to immunize defendants from
prosecution by the International Criminal Court).
119. U.N. Charter art. 27.
120. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. The Security Council has the authority under the
Charter to request an advisory opinion (see supra note 34 and accompanying text), but
such a request is most likely subject to a veto as a non-procedural matter under Article
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Part Two: The Case for Referral Jurisdiction
I. The Doctrinal Case for Referral Jurisdiction
Before all else, the case for referral jurisdiction depends upon its legal-
ity, and, in fact, for the referral initiative to be realized, it would have to
pass legal muster with the Court itself. In particular, the Court would be
presented with two questions regarding authority that I will discuss in
order: (1) does the United Nations General Assembly have the authority
under Articles 22 and 96 to create a subsidiary organ capable of requesting
advisory opinions; and (2) does the Court in its own right have the author-
ity to render advisory opinions on disputes between states without their
consent?
A. The Propriety of the Judicial Commission Under Article 22 and
Article 96 of the United Nations Charter
The Court's precedent supports the proposition that the General
Assembly has the authority to create a subsidiary organ, the primary pur-
pose of which is to request advisory opinions of the Court. In 1950, the
General Assembly created an internal United Nations court-the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal-to adjudicate the United Nations' dis-
putes with its staff.1 2 1 In an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the
Administrative Tribunal process, the General Assembly in 1955 estab-
lished an additional organ, the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgments, to refer judgments of the Administra-
tive Tribunal to the International Court of Justice for review under the
Court's advisory powers. 122 Under G.A. Resolution 957(X), a staff mem-
ber party to the dispute, the Secretary-General, or a member state could
request that the Committee ask the Court for an advisory opinion. 123 If,
upon review, the Committee found a substantial basis for objecting to the
Tribunal's judgment, it was to refer the matter to the Court. 1 24 In certain
respects, the Committee review system established by G.A. Resolution
957(X) pushed the legal envelop further than would the proposed Judicial
Commission, as it provided that the Court's advisory judgments be
accepted as binding by the United Nations, 1 25 and it allowed non-states
(U.N. staff members) access to the Court as litigants. 126 In more than
forty years in existence, the Committee referred three cases to the
27(3) by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. As already men-
tioned, the Security Council has only requested a quasi-contentious advisory opinion on
one occasion. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; infra note 150.
121. Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. AT/11/
Rev.4 (Oct. 3, 1972). In addition to ruling on disputes between the United Nations and
its staff members, the Tribunal's mandate also included adjudging disputes between cer-
tain other U.N. bodies and their staffs.
122. G.A. Res. 957(X), 91 4, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/3116
(Nov. 8, 1955) [hereinafter G.A. Resolution 957(X)].
123. Id. 9 1.
124. Id. 9[ 2.
125. Id. 9[ 3.
126. Id. 9[ 1.
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In the first of these cases, Application for the Review of Judgment No.
158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,128 the Court validated
the legality of the Committee under Articles 22 and 96. At the time of its
creation, some states had contended that the Committee's mandate to play
a role in the process of adjudicating United Nations staff conflicts was not
related to a function of the General Assembly.1 29 This, according to those
states, meant that under Article 22 the Committee was not a subsidiary
organ "necessary for the performance of [the General Assembly's] func-
tions" and, therefore, that it should not be entitled to request advisory
opinions under Article 96.130 In a similar vein, state opponents of estab-
lishing the Committee had contended that the Committee would not have
activities of its own (separate from requesting advisory opinions) that
might qualify it as an organ authorized under Article 96 "to request advi-
sory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities."'13 1
1. The General Assembly's Establishment of the Proposed Judicial
Commission Would be Valid Under Article 22 of the United Nations
Charter
Responding to the first contention, the Court found that pursuant to
Article 101, staff relations were, in fact, within the purview of the General
Assembly, 1 32 but that the legality of the Committee did not hinge on such
a finding of explicit institutional mandate. Because Article 22 specifically
bestows broad discretion upon the General Assembly to establish subsidi-
ary organs as it deems necessary to the performance of its functions, the
Court reasoned that "to place a restrictive interpretation on the power of
the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs would run contrary to
the clear intention of the Charter."'1 3 3
Consistent with this reasoning, the General Assembly has the discre-
tion to create the Judicial Commission to exercise a referral function simi-
lar to that of the Committee. In fact, the subject matter of the Judicial
Commission's referrals would be more clearly within the purview of the
General Assembly than are staff disputes-a subject about which the U.N.
Charter is silent. Under Chapters IV and VI of the Charter, the General
127. The Committee was abolished in 1996. For a recounting of the circumstances of
its abolition, see Virginia Morris & M.-Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Develop-
ments: The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly,
90 Am. J. INT'L L. 491, 493-94 (1996).
128. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 .C.J. 166 (July 12), ihereinafter Judgment No.
1581.
129. Id. at 173-75.
130. Id. at 172. See supra note 109 for the text of Article 22.
131. Judgment No. 158, supra note 128 (emphasis added). See supra note 34 for the
text of Article 96.
132. Judgment No. 158, supra note 128, at 173. Article 101 provides that "[t]he staff
shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the Gen-
eral Assembly." U.N. Charter art. 101, para. 1.
133. Judgment No. 158, supra note 128, at 172.
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Assembly is authorized to discuss and make recommendations regarding
disputes between countries. 13 4 Accordingly, the Court has affirmed the
Assembly's authority to request advisory opinions related to such interstate
disputes on four occasions. 13 5 While the General Assembly is prohibited
by Article 12 from making recommendations regarding disputes the Secur-
ity Council is involved with (unless invited to do so by the Council), 136 the
Court has found Article 12 not to be so broad as to prohibit the Assembly
from requesting advisory opinions regarding such disputes. 13 7 Thus, the
Judicial Commission's delegated function of requesting advisory opinions
regarding disputes between countries would not run afoul of Article 12,
even if the Security Council was involved with the dispute. In fact, the
referral jurisdiction proposal's provision for Security Council deferrals of
advisory requests makes the workings of the Judicial Commission even
more deferential of the Security Council's Article 12 prerogatives than
required. 138
2. The Proposed Judicial Commission's Request of Advisory Opinions
Would be Warranted Under Article 96 of the United Nations Charter
The Court similarly disagreed with the second contention: that
because the Committee lacked an activity other than requesting advisory
opinions, it was incapable under Article 96 of requesting opinions "on
legal questions arising within the scope of [its] activities." The Court reit-
erated that the Charter does not limit the General Assembly's discretion
over the nature of the subsidiary organs it establishes.139 It emphasized,
however, that its conclusion was not dependent upon this discretion
because the Committee's purpose of screening requests for advisory opin-
ions gave it a function, though "admittedly a narrow one," beyond that of
requesting advisory opinions.140
As with the Committee, the proposed Judicial Commission has a
134. U.N. Charter arts. 10-15, 35.
135. See infra notes 149, 151-179 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing
quasi-contentious cases referred to the Court by the General Assembly.)
136. Article 12 of the United Nations Charter provides that "[w]hile the Security
Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in
the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with
regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." U.N. Char-
ter art. 12, para. 1.
137. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136, 148-50 (July 9) [hereinafter Israeli Wall]
(holding that a request for an advisory opinion is not a recommendation under Article
12 and affirming the practice of "the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal
in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security"); accord Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, at 16-17 (July 22, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo].
138. For the description of the Security Council deferral mechanism, see supra notes
115-120 and accompanying text.
139. Judgment No. 158, supra note 128, at 172-75.
140. Id. at 174.
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screening purpose beyond that of only requesting advisory opinions,
14 1
but the Commission's legality does not depend upon its exercise of this
screening function. As the Court made clear in Review of Judgment No.
158, the General Assembly has the discretion to establish the Judicial Com-
mission to request advisory opinions regardless of the narrowness of its
mandate. ' 4
2
The plain language of the Charter and the Court's decision in Review
of Judgment No. 158 leave little doubt as to the legality of the Judicial Com-
mission. In light, however, of the Security Council's successful assertion of
its own expansive powers to establish judicial organs, to the extent that any
doubt does persist, it would have to be resolved in favor of such a preroga-
tive for the General Assembly. The Security Council established the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try individuals for war crimes without
any explicit charter-based authority to establish courts generally, 143 much
less novel war crimes tribunals. The General Assembly's establishment of
a commission to refer cases to the existing principal judicial organ of the
United Nations1 44 would be quite modest by comparison.
B. The Legality of the Court Opining on the Behavior of States Without
Their Consent
The major legal concern that a proposal to universalize the Court's
advisory jurisdiction raises does not relate to the validity of the Judicial
Commission under Articles 22 and 96. Rather, it relates to the more funda-
mental question of the legality of the Court opining on the behavior of
states without their consent. In 1923, the Council of the League of Nations
asked the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion regarding a Soviet-
141. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
142. In addition to the scope of their activities requirement, Article 96 also specifies
that the questions referred to the Court for advisory opinions be "legal matters." The
propriety of the Court rendering advisory judgments in quasi-contentious cases has
been challenged as raising political rather than legal questions, as have cases arising
under Article 36(2), which gives the Court jurisdiction "in all legal disputes." Finding it
impossible to distinguish in practice between political and legal matters, the Court has
never refused to accept a case on the bases that it was political in nature. See, e.g.,
Kosovo, supra note 137, at 12 ("A question which expressly asks the Court whether or
not a particular action is compatible with international law certainly appears to be a
legal question.").
143. See generally, Alfred P. Rubin, An International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 7 (1994) (questioning the authority of the Security
Council to establish a judicial institution which threatens the internal operation of a
state). But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995) (upholding the authority of the Security Council to have established the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
144. U.N. Charter art. 92 ("The International Court of Justice shall be the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations."). For reference to Court decisions interpreting the
implications of the Court's status as the principal judicial organ, see infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
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Finnish dispute over the legal status of Eastern Carelia.14 5 The Soviet
Union vociferously objected to the Permanent Court issuing such an opin-
ion, in part, on the grounds that to do so without its consent would violate
its independence. The Permanent Court agreed.14 6 Ever since, countries
opposing the issuing of advisory opinions regarding their disputes with
other countries have relied on the Eastern Carelia opinion. 14 7 They cite the
opinion as authority for the proposition that affected states must specifi-
cally consent to any judicial proceeding, including even those of an advi-
sory nature.1 48
The Permanent Court holding, however, is not so broad as to require
consent generally today in advisory cases implicating disputes between
countries. Beginning in 1950, as previously mentioned, on five occasions
(regarding human rights in Eastern Europe, 1 49 the South African occupa-
tion of Namibia, 150 self-determination in the Western Sahara," 51 the Israeli
construction of a wall in the Palestinian territories, 15 2 and the Kosovar dec-
laration of independence 1 53) either the General Assembly or the Security
Council has requested that the Court render quasi-contentious advisory
opinions. In not one of these cases did the Court interpret the Eastern
Carelia precedent to preclude it from rendering an advisory opinion. The
Court always found that it had jurisdiction regardless of state consent, or
145. See Request from the Council of the League of Nations to the Permanent Court
of International Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923
P.C.IJ (ser. B) No. 5, at 6 (Apr. 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieB/B_
05/Statut de la Carelie orientale Avis consultatif__l.pdf.
146. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 5, at 27
(July 23) [hereinafter Eastern Carelia].
147. See, e.g., infra notes 149-173 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.CJ. 12, 28 (Oct. 16) [here-
inafter Western Sahara].
149. See Peace Treaties, supra note 114.
150. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 24 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]. The Namibia
opinion was one of four advisory opinions that the Court issued regarding South
Africa's exercise of political control over Namibia between 1950 and 1971. The opinion
referenced here is the only one that raises the relevant issue of quasi-contentious advi-
sory jurisdiction. Because Namibia, one of the interested parties impacted by the deci-
sion, was considered a territory rather than a state at the time of the decision, the case is
not technically quasi-contentious, but I have included it, as the Court's analysis is
directly relevant. For a discussion of a related contentious case involving Namibia, see
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
151. See Western Sahara, supra note 148.
152. See Israeli Wall, supra note 137. Because one of the interested parties impacted
by the Israeli Wall decision, the entity of Palestine, was not as of the time of the decision
generally recognized as a state, Israeli Wall does not technically qualify as a quasi-con-
tentious dispute between two states. I have, nevertheless, included the decision in my
discussion, as the Court's analysis is directly relevant.
153. See Kosovo, supra note 137. As with Namibia and Israeli Wall (discussed supra
note 150 and supra note 152), one of the parties impacted by the Kosovo decision, in this
case the entity of Kosovo, was not generally recognized as a state. In fact, whether it
should be recognized as such was potentially at stake in the decision itself. As with
Namibia and Israeli Wall, I have included the decision in the discussion because the
Court's analysis is directly relevant.
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lack thereof, and in then considering whether as a matter of discretion it
should render an advisory opinion, the Court consistently decided that it
should (except for the Namibia case in which it ended its analysis with
acceptance of jurisdiction).
I will now proceed to explain the Court's rationale for finding that it
had jurisdiction in these cases, and how that rationale supports the validity
of the Court's exercising of referral jurisdiction regardless of state consent.
I will then conclude this Subsection with an explanation of why the Court
has chosen to exercise its discretion in favor of rendering decisions in the
above cases and why it should likewise exercise its discretion to accept
referrals from the proposed Judicial Commission regardless of state
consent.
1. The Court's Jurisdiction to Render Opinions in Quasi-Contentious Cases
The reasoning behind the Court's consistent determination that it has
had jurisdiction to render opinions in quasi-contentious advisory cases is
grounded in two lines of analysis. The first is that international law's
requirement of consent to judicial process does not apply to proceedings
that result in advisory, as opposed to binding, opinions. The second is
that, even were the requirement of consent to apply to advisory opinions,
states have effectively consented to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court
by virtue of their all but universal accession to the United Nations Charter
and Statute of the Court.
a) There is no Requirement of Consent to Advisory Proceedings
The first line of analysis, articulated initially in the Peace Treaties case,
is that "the well established principle of international law" requiring con-
sent to contentious judicial proceedings does not apply to opinions that are
merely advisory. 154 The Court does not explain how this conclusion is
consistent with the Eastern Carelia holding requiring consent to an advi-
sory opinion. Nevertheless, because the context of the two cases is quite
different, their seemingly divergent holdings are, in fact, reconcilable. The
League Covenant was the centerpiece of a grand plan to establish an inte-
grated system of peaceful dispute resolution. In joining the League, coun-
tries agreed to submit their disputes either to arbitration, judicial
settlement (including settlement by the Permanent Court), or to an enquiry
by the League Council (of which advisory opinions came to be a compo-
nent part). 1 5 5 For Russia to stand outside of the League system, therefore,
was to definitively stand outside a voluntary system, which included in its
scheme that disputes be subject to advisory opinions.
154. Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 71.
155. League of Nations Covenant arts. 12-16. The Covenant provided that countries
would not go to war against any country complying with the League's dispute resolution
provisions, and any country not doing so will "be deemed to have committed an act of
war against all other Members of the League." Id. art. 16. For further discussion, see
FRANcis PAUL WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 41-61 (1952).
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International law, however, has evolved. The United Nations
processes today are not fully voluntary. Instead of focusing on dispute res-
olution mechanisms for members, the Charter creates more muscular polit-
ical organs, especially the Security Council with its legal authority to
impose settlements. 15 6 Advisory opinions are now only one of a variety of
options for maintaining international peace and security at the disposal of
a more legally powerful organization. By having not joined the United
Nations at the time of the Peace Treaties decision in 1950,157 Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania had, therefore, only avoided incurring any obliga-
tion of their own to cooperate with the organization. They had no basis for
interfering with the organization's independent authority under its charter
to request advisory opinions.
Although the Peace Treaties decision clearly establishes the power of
the Court to render duly requested advisory opinions over the objections of
states, there is one complication. The decision leaves ambiguous the issue
of whether or not there are jurisdictional limits as to whom those opinions
must be directed and the ends they must serve. The Court begins the sen-
tence that creates the ambiguity by broadly proclaiming that "lilt follows
[from advisory opinions not having binding force] that no state . . .can
prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion."1 58 It concludes, however, with
the qualifying clause, "which the United Nations considers to be desirable
in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should
take."'159 What happens if the opinion is not for the United Nations' own
internal use? Can the Court's advisory opinion also be sought if not for the
specific ends of informing the United Nations?
This is a key question for our purposes because providing a mecha-
nism for the Court to issue quasi-contentious advisory opinions at the
instigation of complaining countries rather than the United Nations is at
the core of this Article's proposal for referral jurisdiction. Fortunately, the
Court in subsequent cases moves away from language implying that its
advisory jurisdiction in quasi-contentious cases is solely limited to answer-
ing requests for opinions by United Nations organs as to the course of
action they should take. While the Namibia decision also associated the
Court's jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions regarding country disputes
with a United Nations organ seeking the opinion "with reference to its own
156. See infra notes 224-226 (referencing the Security Council's power to impose
settlements). Under the League Covenant, settlement by reference to the Council of the
League was only one of the dispute resolution options available at the discretion of the
parties. See League of Nations Covenant arts. 12, 15. The League Council, unlike the
United Nations Security Council, only had authority to recommend enforcement mea-
sures to other members of the League of Nations. See League of Nations Covenant art.
16.
157. See G.A. Res. 995(X), U.N. Doc. A/RES/995(X) (Dec. 14, 1955) (authorizing the
1955 admission of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to the United Nations).
158. Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 27.
159. Id. The court continues in a similar vein in the succeeding sentence: "The
Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request
it." Id.
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decisions,"'160 this is in contrast to the more recent Western Sahara, Israeli
Wall, and Kosovo decisions.
In Western Sahara the Court quoted the ambiguous sentence referred
to above from Peace Treaties. It then, however, implied its understanding of
the sentence's meaning by concluding without reference to any jurisdic-
tional restrictions that "[tihe Court ...affirmed in this pronouncement
that its competence to give an opinion did not depend on the consent of
the interested States, even when the case concerned a legal question actu-
ally pending between them."161 Similarly, in the Israeli Wall opinion, the
Court quoted the ambiguous sentence from Peace Treaties as support for its
categorical observation that "the lack of consent to the Court's contentious
jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court's jurisdiction
to give an advisory opinion" (emphasis added). 162 Finally, Kosovo pro-
vides the Court's clearest indication that jurisdiction in quasi-contentious
cases has no relationship to the purpose of the requested opinion. In
accepting jurisdiction in that case, the Court did not mention the ambigu-
ous sentence in Peace Treaties nor even, for that matter, the Eastern Carelia
decision itself.163
The most plausible reading of the Charter of the United Nations and
Statute of the Court supports this understanding that the Court's exercise
of advisory jurisdiction in quasi-contentious cases is not restricted to ren-
dering opinions advising United Nations organs on their own course of
action. Nowhere in either document is there a requirement that an advi-
sory opinion must be for the internal use of the organ requesting the opin-
ion. Article 96 of the Charter specifies the circumstances under which
advisory opinions may be requested. The only limitations that it places are
that if requested by the General Assembly or the Security Council, the
request be "on any legal question." If requested by another organ or spe-
cialized agency, the organ or agency must be "so authorized by the General
Assembly," and the request must be "on a legal question arising within the
scope of [the organ's or agency's] activities.' 1 6 4 Only a very expansive
interpretation of these provisions could see in them a requirement that
advisory opinions may only be requested by the requesting body for its
internal use. Likewise, Article 65 of the Court's Statute, which authorizes
it to give advisory opinions, does not restrict the purposes to which those
decisions may be put. Its only restrictions are that the opinion must be on
a "legal question" and at the request of those so "authorized by or in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations."'165
160. Namibia, supra note 150, at 24.
161. Western Sahara, supra note 148, at 24.
162. Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 157-58.
163. See Kosovo, supra note 137.
164. U.N. Charter art. 96. For the full text of Article 96, see supra note 34.
165. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. For the full text of Article 65, paragraph 1, see
supra note 114.
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b) States Have Consented to the Court's Advisory Jurisdiction by
Virtue of their Accession to the United Nations Charter and the
Court Statute
In the end, it may not matter whether the Court can issue non-binding
opinions regarding interstate disputes without state consent. This is
because unlike Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania at the time of Peace Trea-
ties in 1950, states today have given their consent by virtually universally
acceding to the United Nations Charter and the Court Statute.1 6 6 As previ-
ously discussed, states have specifically granted the General Assembly and
the Security Council the right to request advisory opinions in Article 96(1)
of the United Nations Charter, 16 7 and they have specifically granted the
Court the power to render such opinions in Article 65 of the Court's
Statute. 168
The argument that states have consented to the Court's advisory juris-
diction is its central justification for accepting jurisdiction in both
Namibia169 and Western Sahara. 170 The Eastern Carelia decision itself gives
the argument particular force because the Permanent Court maintained
that if Russia had consented to the Court's advisory jurisdiction "once and
for all" by joining the League, 1 71 the results in the case would likely have
been different. 172
166. Today, all internationally recognized states (except for the state of the Vatican
City) are full members of the United Nations. Only state-like entities whose statehood is
for some reason contested have been denied full membership in the organization. For
example, because the People's Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing, and the
Republic of China, with its capital in Taipei, have each traditionally maintained that
there is only one state of China, only the Beijing regime is currently accredited to
represent China.
167. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1. For the full text of Article 96, see supra note 34.
168. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. For the full text of Article 65, paragraph 1, see
supra note 114.
169. Namibia, supra note 150, at 23-24. "However, [Eastern Carelia] is not relevant,
as it differs from the present [case]. For instance, one of the states concerned was not at
the time a Member of the League of Nations and did not appear before the Permanent
Court. South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, is bound by Article 96 of the
Charter, which empowers the Security Council to request advisory opinions on any legal
question." Id. at 23.
170. Western Sahara, supra note 148, at 23-24. "In [Eastern Carelia] one of the States
concerned was neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor, at the time, a
Member of the League of Nations, and lack of competence of the League to deal with a
dispute involving non-member states which refused its intervention was a decisive rea-
son for the Court's declining to give an answer. In the present case, Spain is a Member
of the United Nations and has accepted the provisions of the Charter and Statute; it has
thereby given in general its consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdic-
tion." Id.
171. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Russian/Soviet member-
ship in the League of Nations).
172. Eastern Carelia, supra note 146, at 27. The Court in Peace Treaties does not rely
upon consent by virtue of acceding to the United Nations Charter, presumably because
the states objecting to the Court's jurisdiction (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) were
not yet members of the United Nations in 1950. The Court also avoids the argument in
the Israeli Wall case, probably because an interested, though non-objecting party, Pales-
tine, was not generally considered a state and was not a member of the United Nations.
Similarly, in the Kosovo case, Kosovo, whose declaration of independence was at issue,
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Thus, states, in acceding to the Charter, have not only consented to
allow the Security Council and the General Assembly to seek advisory
opinions under Article 96(1). They have also consented to Article 96(2),
which would allow the Judicial Commission as an "other organ of the
United Nations so authorized by the General Assembly" to similarly
request advisory opinions of the Court.1 73
2. The Court's Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Quasi-Contentious
Advisory Cases
While the Court may have jurisdiction to render advisory opinions
upon referral of the proposed Judicial Commission, the Court could refuse
to exercise this jurisdiction. Article 65 of the Court's Statute provides that
the Court "may" give advisory opinions, and, as previously noted, the
Court has repeatedly held that the word "may" in Article 65 means that it
has discretion to decline to give an advisory opinion. 174 How then should
the Court exercise its discretion to answer the Judicial Commission's advi-
sory referrals of cases involving disputes between states?
a) That an Advisory Opinion be Intended for the Internal Use of the
Requesting Organ Has Been a Relevant Factor in the Court's Exercise
of Discretion
Although there may be no jurisdictional requirement that advisory
opinions be intended for the internal use of the organ requesting the opin-
ion, that they be for that purpose has been a clear factor in the Court's
exercise of its discretion. Though the Court did not consider the purpose
of the request in either Peace Treaties or Namibia,175 its decision to render
advisory opinions in the Western Sahara, Israeli Wall, and Kosovo cases
turned primarily on the fact that the opinions were to be used internally by
the requesting U.N. organ.
In Western Sahara, the Court asserted that "the lack of consent of an
interested state may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible
with the Court's judicial character." 17 6 However, it agreed to render the
opinion in the case because "the object of the request" was "to obtain from
the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deem[ed] of assistance
to it for the proper exercise of its function." 17 7 In the Israeli Wall decision,
was not a member of the United Nations. See supra note 166 for a discussion of state-
hood and its relationship to United Nations membership.
173. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2. See supra note 34 for the full text of Article 96.
174. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. See supra note 114 for the text of Article 65
and cases maintaining that the Court has discretion to decline giving advisory opinions.
175. In Peace Treaties, the Court decided to exercise its discretion to render an advi-
sory opinion over the objections of interested states because the matter at issue was
procedural and did not go to the merits of the dispute. Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at
70. In Namibia, once the Court determined that it had jurisdiction, it did not consider
using its discretion to refuse to give the advisory opinion. Namibia, supra note 150, at
27.
176. Western Sahara, supra note 148, at 25.
177. Id. at 25, 27.
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the Court, reiterating that the purpose of the request is relevant to the
Court's discretion rather than its jurisdiction, concluded that "[gliven the
powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to
international peace and security, it is the Court's view that the construc-
tion of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United
Nations."'178 Finally, in the Kosovo decision, the Court made clear as part
of its discretionary analysis that advisory opinions are "not a form of judi-
cial recourse for States but the means by which [requesting organs] may
obtain the Court's opinion in order to assist them in their activities."'179
b) The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion in Favor of Accepting
Referrals from the Judicial Commission
Because determining what constitutes a proper purpose is within the
Court's discretion, the Court is free to depart from its position that the
purpose of an advisory opinion should be to inform the United Nations.
The establishment of the Judicial Commission by the General Assembly
would be a change in circumstances that would give the Court very strong
process and substantive reasons to answer the call of the Commission to
deliver advisory opinions.
Regarding process, while there is not yet a well-settled doctrine of sep-
aration of powers in the international system,180 the General Assembly, as
the closest equivalent to a popular branch of international governance, is
entitled to a certain deference by the Court. Surely, if the Assembly's
almost-universal country membership' 8 1 were to decide intra vires upon a
process whereby that same membership could secure advisory rulings on
interstate disputes, then that decision should be accorded significant
weight. And closer to home, the Court should be influenced as well by its
own constitutional role as the "principal judicial organ of the United
Nations."18 2 As the Court itself has repeatedly acknowledged, this status
under the Charter implies an obligation to cooperate with the General
Assembly and the Security Council such that only compelling reasons
should lead it to refuse to render opinions.18 3
178. Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 159.
179. Kosovo, supra note 137, at 14.
180. Attempting to conceptualize the nature and extent of separation of powers in the
international system has, nevertheless, been a subject of keen interest to academic com-
mentators. For a recent and very interesting edited volume whose authors explore this
and related topics in global constitutionalism, see RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds.,
2009).
181. See supra note 166 (discussing the extent of the United Nations' membership).
182. See supra note 144.
183. Kosovo, supra note 137, at 13; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Pro-
cess of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion,
1999 I.CJ. 62, 78-79 (Apr. 29); Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 156; Judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization Upon Complaints
Made Against the U.N.E.S.C.O., 1956 I.CJ. 77, 86 (Oct. 23); Peace Treaties, supra note
114, at 71.
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Regarding substance, the Court has never explicitly connected the
dots as to why an opinion on a dispute between countries addressed to a
United Nations organ should be consistent with judicial propriety while an
opinion offered for the purpose of directly furthering dispute resolution
should not. The Court's implicit rationale, drawn from the original con-
cerns in Eastern Carelia, however, is that to engage directly in dispute reso-
lution without explicit consent-even in an advisory capacity-improperly
impinges upon state sovereignty, while merely giving advice to a U.N.
organ does not. The sovereignty concern, however, at least when applied to
accepting referrals from the proposed Judicial Commission, is ill-founded.
First, the rendering of an advisory opinion to states, even without their
consent, does not impinge upon the realm of protected sovereignty as that
realm is understood today. 18 4 One must draw a distinction between bind-
ing decisions, which encroach upon states' autonomy by requiring them to
act in accordance with the decisions, and mere advisory opinions, which
do not. If advisory opinions are to be considered an improper infringe-
ment on state sovereignty, then so should commentary on state behavior
rendered by other agencies of international officialdom, such as the United
Nations Human Rights Council 185 and the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral. 18 6 That state behavior is subject to international scrutiny has gradu-
ally become accepted in international law. 18 7 For the Court to imply a
contrary notion in its exercise of discretion would unnecessarily cast doubt
184. In fact, even in its own time, the Eastern Carelia decision's extreme deference to
sovereignty was highly contested. The opinion was decided by only a seven to four
majority. It was strongly criticized in the League Council, see League of Nations,
Twenty-Sixth Session of the Council, Nineteenth Meeting, held at Geneva on Thursday,
September 27, 1923, at 3:30 p.m., in 4 League of Nations OJ. 1335 -37, and by commen-
tators of the day, see, for example, ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT
278-79 (Elizabeth F. Read, trans.1925) and KARL STRuPP, LA QUESTION CARELIENNE ET LE
DROIT DES GENS (1924).
185. The Human Rights Council was created in 2006 by the General Assembly with a
mandate to make recommendations concerning situations of human rights violations.
See G.A. Res. 60/251, . 5(f), (i), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006). For back-
ground on the Human Rights Council, see Ved P. Nanda, 2006 Myres S. McDougal Dis-
tinguished Lecture: The Protection of Human Rights Under International Law: Will the
U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm "Responsibility to Protect"
Make a Difference?, in 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 353, 357-65 (2007).
186. The Secretary-General routinely expresses opinions on matters of global con-
cern, including the conduct of states. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, U.S.
Pressures North Korea After Sinking Of South's Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A4
(discussing the Secretary-General's criticism of North Korea over alleged attack on
South Korean warship). The Secretary-General's authority to comment is derived from
his intrinsic powers as the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations under
Charter Article 97 and, more specifically, from his Article 99 authority to bring matters
to the attention of the Security Council. See Simma, supra note 107, at 1195-96,
1217-30; see also STEPHEN SCHWEBEL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
His POLITICAL POWERS AND PRACTICE 24-26 (1952).
187. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 229-49 (1995) (discussing in
various contexts the "systematic review and assessment" by international organizations
of state compliance with treaty obligations).
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on the normative foundations of a promising new class of international
compliance mechanisms.
Even if advisory opinions were not deemed safely outside the concep-
tual boundaries of what remains of sovereignty in today's world, the Court
has good reason to push those boundaries when exercising its discretion.
The late Jonathan Charney, writing in the American Journal of International
Law, captured the essence of why sovereignty is problematic and contested
today:
Complete autonomy may have been acceptable in the past when no state
could take actions that would threaten the international community as a
whole. Today, the enormous destructive potential of some activities and the
precarious condition of some objects of international concern make full
autonomy undesirable, if not potentially catastrophic.
1 8 8
To the extent that Charney's perspective is correct, then by concep-
tually sheltering sovereignty, the Court would be doing no service to the
global order. Even to the extent, however, that sovereignty may retain some
normative validity, its future as a practical matter is imperiled by autono-
mous social and economic forces larger than the issue of whether the
Court were to accept referrals from the Judicial Commission. In a conces-
sion to the practical realities of an interdependent world, sovereignty today
is by necessity honored in the breach in many areas of global social life, 18 9
including specifically the area of dispute resolution. 190
As we have seen, even the Court itself has agreed, over the protests of
affected states, to all five of the General Assembly and Security Council
requests for quasi-contentious advisory opinions. The Court's rationale
that the opinions are to U.N. organs for their own use rather than to the
188. Jonathan 1. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 530
(1993).
189. Since the time of Charney's writing, the acceleration of economic and social
globalization has, if anything, expanded the institutional spheres in which states no
longer exercise many of the traditional prerogatives of sovereignty. A great deal of aca-
demic effort has gone into attempting to both assess and critique the areas in which
sovereignty is in decline. For some of the most important works, see STEPHEN D. KRAS-
NER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (arguing that differences in power and
interests rather than respect for sovereignty best explain state behavior); RE-ENVISIONING
SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing the
challenges to traditional sovereignty emerging from use of force to protect human rights,
norms relating to governance, the war on terror, economic globalization, the natural
environment, and changes in strategic thinking); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (Gerald Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) (presenting a variety of contexts in which
the traditional prerogatives of states are being challenged by contemporary problems);
BENN STEIL & MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MARKETS, AND SOVEREIGNTY (2009) (discussing the
tension between globalization and sovereign control of monetary and financial policy);
SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD EcON-
OMY (1996) (exploring the challenge posed by non-state actors to economic sovereignty);
THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Liftin ed., 1998) (discussing
the tension between traditional notions of sovereignty and the need for international
cooperation to protect the global environment).
190. See infra notes 250-251 and accompanying text (explaining that lack of consent
is no longer a bar to the jurisdiction of many of the international system's specialized
tribunals).
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disputing parties is a distinction without a practical difference, as the legal
and political implications of an advisory opinion are the same regardless of
the origins of the request. If anything, an advisory process open to all
countries would be, if not more respectful of state autonomy, then at least
equally respectful of state autonomy. As matters now stand, the General
Assembly and Security Council determinations of which conflicts get hear-
ings before the Court are clearly political. 191 As a tribunal dedicated to
equal justice, the Court would have good reason to exercise its discretion
in favor of hearing referrals from a Judicial Commission that is staffed by
independent international civil servants whose decision-making is based
on clear legal criteria.
II. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will
Improve Compliance with International Law
I have suggested in Part One that referral jurisdiction would improve
the functioning of the international legal system, but how exactly would it
do so, and are there persuasive arguments against universalizing the
Court's advisory jurisdiction? In this Section II of Part Two, I will make the
case that referral jurisdiction would improve state compliance with inter-
national law. Following in Section III, I will rebut what I believe to be the
most important objection to the practical functioning of referral jurisdic-
tion, namely that states will disregard and ultimately discard international
tribunals that exercise their powers without state consent.
One of the principle performance criteria by which any legal system
should be judged is the extent to which it promotes compliance with the
law. Achieving compliance is a particular challenge in the international
system where there is no sovereign authority capable of enforcing its law
directly on states. In the 19th century, the legal philosopher John Austin,
best known for criticizing international law's lack of enforceability, 192 nev-
ertheless offered what has, over time, been the most general and widely
accepted description of how international law compliance is achieved.
Austin's characterization of compliance, which I will refer to as the court of
international opinion model,193 depicts a state system of peer pressure anal-
ogous to the systems that emerge in human societies that lack formal insti-
191. See generally Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Role of the International Court of
Justice and its "Judicial' Character: Past and Future Prisms, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS, supra note 93, at 294-96 (describing the
politicization of the process of requesting an advisory opinion in the General Assembly).
192. Austin argued that because international law is not enforceable in the same way
as domestic law, it is not really law, but rather a system of "positive morality." JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954)
(1832).
193. In his own original presentation of the model, Austin described the duties that
international law imposes as being enforced "by fear on the part of sovereigns of provok-
ing general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims
generally received and respected." Id.
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tutions of law. 194 The phenomenon of states collectively passing informal
judgment on the behavior of other states has been variously described by
many post-Austinian commentators, but all share in common the idea that
if a state violates international law, the other states will take notice and
initiate various individual or collective actions to punish that state.19 5
While the 20th century saw the rudiments of a supernational political
structure begin to emerge, mostly in the form of subject-specific interna-
tional regimes such as the World Trade Organization and the World Health
Organization, 196 Austin's court of international opinion model is still a
generally accurate description of the dynamics of compliance among states
who, even today, answer to no supreme authority.
Our question is whether, in this still largely Austinian international
system, referral jurisdiction would improve law compliance. For those who
draw their primary understanding of law by analogy to domestic systems,
it might seem intuitive that substituting access to a real court for the ersatz
court of international opinion would promote legal compliance. The inter-
national system, however, is deceptively different from national law sys-
tems, and domestic institutions cannot be simply transplanted to the
international order with the expectation that they will function in the same
way. Even the binding opinions of international courts cannot be enforced
as straightforwardly as those of domestic courts that operate as adjuncts of
states with centralized enforcement systems. Because of the unique politi-
cal constraints of the international system, however, we can only cut the
Gordian Knot so far as to expand the advisory jurisdiction of the Court,
and we are limited to doing so in an ad hoc way, rather than as part of a
comprehensive scheme to rationalize the global justice system.
To answer then what turns out to be the complex question of whether
the Court's exercise of referral jurisdiction is likely to improve interna-
tional compliance, the analytical tools of modern compliance theory are
helpful. While such theory is primarily intended to be descriptive of how
the present international system secures compliance, we can employ it for
our speculative purpose of predicting whether compliance would be
194. See MICHAEL BARKUM, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1968) (analogizing the processes of the international legal sys-
tem to those of societies with no system of centralized governance).
195. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1293, 1298 (1984) (arguing that international law is still law despite its lack of central-
ized enforcement because in the international system "the social-disapproval factor oper-
ates as a sanction."); Richard Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical
Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L. Q. 295 (1959) (distinguishing between enforce-
ment in vertical legal systems of domestic orders that have the ability to compel obedi-
ence to their commands and enforcement in the horizontal international legal system in
which there is no centralized authority to enforce commands); Louis HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE 26, 52-56 (2d ed. 1979) (characterizing international law's horizontal
enforcement mechanism as being "in the reactions of other nations").
196. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text and infra notes 250-251 for a par-
tial listing of subject-specific regimes and the dispute resolution bodies associated with
them.
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improved by the International Court of Justice substituting more often for
the court of international opinion.
Three branches of compliance theory are particularly useful for this
purpose. The first, transnational legal process theory, helps explain why
reliance on the court of international opinion serves to frustrate the emer-
gence of a global culture of law compliance and why substituting reliance
on the International Court of Justice would serve to nurture such a culture.
The second, Thomas Franck's specific application of legitimacy theory to
the international system, is helpful for understanding why the indetermi-
nacy of international law undermines compliance and why supplanting the
judgments of the court of international opinion with those of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice would help make international law less indetermi-
nate. Finally, rationalist, or instrumentalist, compliance theory is most
helpful in explaining why the inability of the court of international opinion
to reliably identify law breakers diminishes the incentive of countries to
obey international law and why increased reliance on the more reliable
International Court of Justice would strengthen countries' incentive to
obey the law.
A. Transnational Legal Process Theory and the Culture of Global Law
Compliance
Transnational legal process theorists attempt to explain obedience to
international law by looking to how international norms become internal-
ized within nations so that they comply voluntarily. 19 7 Harold Koh, one of
the most influential transnational legal process theorists, 198 distinguishes
between legal internalization, whereby international norms become offi-
cially binding and enforceable within a country's domestic legal system,
and social and political internalization, whereby a country's political elite as
well as its general public respectively come to believe that international
197. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transna-
tional Legal Process, Lecture at the University of Nebraska College of Law (Oct. 28,
1994), in 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
198. In addition to Koh's scholarship, several works of other theorists have contrib-
uted to the development of the transnational legal process school. See, e.g., ABRAM
CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968) (laying the theoretical foundation for
the development of the transnational legal process school); ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 14].-62 (1981) (discussing the process whereby
the internalization of international law within national bureaucracies leads states to
comply with international law); Johanna van Sambeek & Mireille Hector, Disseminating
of IHL at the Domestic Level: The Experiences of the Netherlands Red Cross, in MAKING THE
VOICE OF HUMANITY HEARD 385-97 (L. Lijnzaad et al. eds., 2004) (attempting to demon-
strate a correlation between the domestic dissemination of knowledge about interna-
tional humanitarian law and enhanced compliance); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (evaluating the "liberal"
claim that domestic interest groups can successfully pressure their governments to con-
form to treaty-created international human rights obligations). For a concise but highly
informative study of the transnational legal process movement, see Mary Ellen
O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334 (1999).
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norms should be followed as a matter of right.1 99
To the extent that international law generally becomes socially and
politically internalized within a state, that state's general compliance is
likely to improve. How much this internalization process occurs within
any given state is heavily influenced by global social forces. Just as some-
one is likely to develop very different personal predilections toward follow-
ing traffic laws depending upon whether her driving ethos was shaped by
life in Rome or Singapore, so too participants in the international commu-
nity are influenced by that community's general compliance culture. 20 0 At
present, the global culture of compliance leaves considerable room for
improvement. An important move in the direction of this improvement
would be to reduce reliance on the court of international opinion in favor
of the International Court of Justice.
That countries in their role as judges of the court of international
opinion are observably biased toward their own political interests and
those of their allies undermines the development of a healthy culture of law
compliance. After all, individuals will not internalize an ethos of respect
for an international legal system that they perceive is not deserving of such
respect. To the extent then that the institutionally independent Interna-
tional Court of Justice 20 1 more often substitutes for the court of interna-
tional opinion, the reputation of the international system for dispensing
impartial justice would likely improve and along with it the necessary pre-
conditions for a culture of global law compliance.
B. Thomas Franck's Legitimacy Theory and the Role of Indeterminacy
in Undermining Law Compliance
Thomas Franck, blending positivist and normative methodological tra-
ditions, examined compliance with international law through the lens of
legitimacy theory. 20 2 Franck argued that to the extent that nations accept
international rules as legitimate or normatively valid, they will be more
likely to obey them, or in his terms, the rules will have more compliance
pull.20 3 Franck described four barometers of a norm's legitimacy.
20 4 Of
199. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ.
2599, 2656-57 (1997).
200. See generally Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 49-51
(1995) (discussing the various forces that mold the "international culture of
compliance").
201. Judicial independence is one of the core principles to which the Court's Statute
is dedicated. See ICJ Statute, supra note 23, arts. 4-20.
202. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990). Drawing on what he generally categorizes as the three main branches of domes-
tic legitimacy theory (Weberian, Habermasian, and Marxist), Franck offers a working
definition of legitimacy adapted to the international system as "a property of a rule or
rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process."
Id. at 24; see also id. at 17-18.
203. Id. at 24-26.
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particular relevance for our purposes is its rule clarity, or determinacy.2 0 5
Franck explained that the more indeterminate or ambiguous a rule, "the
less compliance pull it is likely to exert" because "obviously a rule that
cannot be understood is unlikely to be obeyed."'20 6 Even if a rule is under-
standable in a general sense, to the extent that countries can plausibly jus-
tify behavior in accordance with inconsistent interpretations of it, the rule
will lose its ability to influence them.
One of the great deficiencies of the court of international opinion is
that it promotes such indeterminacy. This is because, in addition to their
bias discussed above, the court of international opinion's country mem-
bers have a tendency to remain inscrutably silent in the face of a legal dis-
pute. Alternatively, if they do happen to find their magisterial voices, they
are likely to contradict one another, and often with political statements
that lack legal character.
Even in the domestic context, relying on the vagaries of public opinion
to determine judicial outcomes unsettles legal norms. This was, for exam-
ple, the case in ancient Athens during the classical period, when popular
juries that could number in the hundreds, or sometimes even thousands,
confused standards of social conduct by capriciously applying the Athe-
nian Legal Code. 20 7 At least in Athens, however, jurors had a defined legal
code to work from. In the international system, the law to be applied is
itself often ill-defined.
Treaties and customary international law are generally considered the
two primary sources of international law.20 8 While treaties, like all writ-
ten documents, can be construed in different ways, their settled text, like
the Athenian Legal Code, provides some level of constraint on plausible
interpretations. Customary international law, on the other hand, is
famously amorphous. 20 9 According to traditional doctrine, customary
204. See id. Franck's four barometers of a norm's legitimacy are: its rule clarity or
determinacy (Chapters 4, 5 & 6); its symbolic validation by rituals and pedigree (Chap-
ters 7 & 8); its validation by coherence (Chapters 9 & 10); and its conformity with the
normative hierarchy of secondary rules that define the international system's right pro-
cess (Chapter 11).
205. Id. at chs. 4-6.
206. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 56 (1992) [hereinafter Franck, Emerging Right].
207. See MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN 19-21, 40-42 (1998) (describ-
ing how rhetoric influenced Athenian juries).
208. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 38(1)(a)-(b) (listing international con-
ventions (treaties) as first and customary international law as second among the sources
of international law that the Court's Statute authorizes the Court to apply).
209. For example, in a well-known article J. Patrick Kelly concludes:
[Customary international law ("CIL")] survives only because nations and theo-
rists mean radically different things when they use the term. For some scholars,
CIL is consent-based, for others it is consensus-based. Some scholars argue that
CIL is an unconscious, slow process that generates a shared conviction of obli-
gation. Other scholars and nations see custom as a dynamic process that can
change rapidly or even instantly. CIL serves and can be manipulated by many
masters because its elements, state practice and opinio juris, have no ascertaina-
ble meaning and are routinely ignored.
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international law is created when states act (state practice) out of a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).21 0 This simple formula belies uncertainty
over exactly which normative standards should be given the status of cus-
tomary international law. To take just one example of the considerable
doctrinal disorder that exists regarding state practice, there is no clear
agreement on how many states need to engage in what sort of practice and
for how long for that practice to qualify as a custom.2 11 Similar doctrinal
confusion complicates the determination of what constitutes opinio
juris.2 12 There is even basic disagreement over the extent to which tradi-
tional state practice and opinio juris remain the elements of custom. 2 13
The result of filtering normative rays that are obscure at inception
through the court of international opinion's interpretive fog is to produce
only a dim silhouette of law. And as Franck's explanation of the relation-
ship between determinacy and compliance makes clear, such legal opacity
is a formula for frustrating the good intentions of those who wish to ascer-
tain and abide by the law and facilitating the bad intentions of those who
wish to obfuscate and disregard it.
In contrast, enhanced reliance on the International Court of Justice
could help settle customary international law as well as international law
in general. Because the International Court of Justice issues formal written
opinions that elaborate with specificity upon its understanding of the law,
it can help to flesh out the meaning of vague and indeterminate laws. 2 14
Of course, the specialized tribunals of the international system can also
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449,
458-59 (2000).
210. See IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990).
211. Compare, e.g., ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 87-90 (1971) (arguing that only physical acts of states, as opposed to state protests
and other official statements, constitute state practice) with Maarten Bos, The Recognized
Manifestations of International Law: A New Theory of "Sources", 20 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L.
9, 30-33 (1977) (arguing that self-interested acts of states-including physical acts-in
violation of established norms of international law do not constitute state practice).
212. Compare, e.g., I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 145-46 (1954) (arguing that a state's failure to protest arguably
illegal actions of other states indicates acceptance of the actions as legal) with D'AMATO,
supra note 211, at 68-70 (arguing that a state's failure to protest another state's act does
not indicate acceptance of the act as legal).
213. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions in Outer Space: "Instant" Custom-
ary Law, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965) (arguing that United Nations General Assembly
resolutions should be considered the equivalent of state practice and opinio juris and,
therefore, constitute binding customary law).
214. Professor Franck provides, by way of illustration, two instances of the Court
performing this law-settling role with regard to treaty interpretation:
[T]he International Court of Justice, in interpreting Article 83(1) of the [Law of
the Sea] Convention . . . , has taken a highly indeterminate text-one that calls
for "an equitable solution" in apportioning an undersea coastal shelf among
neighboring states-and has rendered it increasingly determinate. So, too, as a
result of litigation between Finland and Denmark currently before the Court,
will we "discover" whether a tall, self-propelled oil rig constitutes a "vessel"
under the right of unimpeded passage through straits as established by the Law
of the Sea Convention.
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help settle the law.2 15 As discussed in Part One, Section 1,216 however, in
many cases no tribunal has authority to exercise jurisdiction. Also, when
conflicting judgments of specialized tribunals fail to settle the law, the
International Court of Justice is best positioned to assume the role of set-
tler of last resort. 21 7
C. Rationalist Compliance Theory and the Costs of Noncompliance
In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes, who argued that nations, inhab-
iting a state of nature, only follow the law of nations when it serves their
self-interest, 2 18 rationalist (or instrumentalist) compliance theorists
21 9
employ the tools of cost-benefit analysis 220 and other related implements of
economics 2 21 to explain obedience to international law. Unlike the trans-
national legal process school and the Franckian legitimacy theory, both of
which emphasize normativity, rationalist compliance theorists attempt to
demonstrate theoretically and empirically that nations follow international
rules based on calculated, if complex, perceptions that the benefits of com-
pliance outweigh the costs of noncompliance.
Franck, Emerging Right, supra note 206, at 56-57.
215. In addition to tribunals, organizations that help settle customary international
law by precisely codifying its content in written documents are also part of the interna-
tional system. The most important of these organizations is the International Law Com-
mission, a committee of experts established by the United Nations General Assembly in
1947. See International Law Commission, Introduction, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/
(last visited May 30, 2011). While the International Law Commission and other codifi-
cation organizations have contributed to defining customary international law, because
the scope of their work and status potential is limited, they are no substitute for
expanding the jurisdiction of the Court.
216. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
217. Even acting in an advisory capacity, the Court is capable of playing the role of
settler of last resort. As is fairly typical of international tribunals, the Court's Statute
provides that even its decisions in contentious cases are only binding between the par-
ties to the dispute. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 59. Rather than being technically
binding, therefore, all Court opinions-both advisory and contentious-are highly influ-
ential as to what the law is, and, therefore, how it should be interpreted by tribunals in
subsequent cases.
218. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 94-110 (Oxford University Press 1965)
(1651).
219. In recent years there has been a proliferation of scholarship in this area. For
some of the more influential works from a variety of subdisciplines and perspectives, see
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREw T.
GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); Kenneth
W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International
Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985); Jeffrey Dunoff &Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and
Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394
(1999); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 226
(1985).
220. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory] (employing
cost-benefit analysis to explain compliance with international law).
221. Primary among these is game theory, which uses applied mathematics to
attempt to explain the strategic choices that actors make in an environment where out-
comes are dependent upon decisions made by others. See generally JOEL P. TRACHTMAN,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (applying principles of game
theory to international law).
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The international community can only impose costs for noncompli-
ance with international law-either through moral censure and the con-
comitant loss of reputation 2 22 or through the imposition of formal
sanctions-to the extent it can identify wrongdoers. From the point of view
of potential wrongdoers, the lower the likelihood that the international
community will impose those costs, the lower the incentive to comply with
the law. Here again, the court of international opinion falls short. The
same institutional deficiencies (countries as judges remaining silent, con-
tradicting one another, and issuing non-legal and politically biased state-
ments) that hinder that court's ability to speak clearly as to the content of
international law also hinder its ability to render verdicts that unequivo-
cally convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent. Because advisory judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice could identify more clearly the
extent to which parties are in the legal right as well as the nature and extent
of the remedy owed, their greater availability has the potential to deter the
illegal behavior of rationally self-interested states.
Of course, such states, rationally calculating the benefits to be gained
versus the costs to be incurred by flouting international law, will factor as
costless an advisory opinion that carries with it no enforcement, no matter
how clear that opinion may be. Thus, the unique way in which the interna-
tional system, lacking sovereign means of enforcement, would give effect to
a Court judgment that is by its own terms merely advisory requires some
explanation.
An advisory opinion vindicating a state's position would stand above
the maelstrom of conflicting partisan claims. As an authoritative statement
of law by the international system's most venerable tribunal, the opinion
would serve as a normative polestar for the international community. In
the subsequent dynamics of dispute disposition between the parties, the
opinion's moral weight and diplomatic impact would advantage the win-
ner. Even the implicit or explicit threat that a wronged state may seek out
an opinion of the Court could encourage law-breaking states to settle on
favorable terms, or at least terms where the law's role relative to diplomatic
or military power is enhanced.
The universalization of the Court's advisory jurisdiction could have a
particular impact in the area of international peace and security where the
proliferation of advisory opinions could complement the work of the Secur-
ity Council. In coming to inform the Council with some regularity as to
the law in peace and security related disputes, the Court would put norma-
tive pressure on the Council to take measures consistent with that law. 2 23
222. See Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 220, at 1847-51 (discussing
the nature and compliance implications of the reputational costs that can be imposed on
states for violating international law).
223. As discussed in Part I, Section 1, the Charter authorizes the Security Council to
request quasi-contentious advisory opinions of the Court (see supra note 34 and accom-
panying text), but it has done so on only one occasion (see supra note 150). By replac-
ing General Assembly or Security Council politics (including the veto) with regularized
legal procedures for initiating quasi-contentious advisory opinions, my proposal would
ensure that such opinions play a more regular role in Security Council decision-making.
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In taking such measures, the moral force of the Court's authority would
buttress the legitimacy of the Council's actions. Additionally, if the Coun-
cil went so far as to formally adopt the Court's judgments as its own Article
39 determinations, 2 24 they would be binding on the parties pursuant to
Article 25 and Article 48.225 Once so adopted, the Council would have the
legal authority under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter to take measures to
enforce the Court's opinions. 22 6
III. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will
Strengthen Rather than Weaken the International Court of
Justice
If advancing the rule of international law is referral jurisdiction's great
benefit to the global legal system, are there also ways its introduction could
harm that system or the Court specifically? Many who support the inter-
national law project would answer in the affirmative. To their minds,
states in a weak international system with limited enforcement powers will
disregard and ultimately discard international institutions that exercise
powers without state acquiescence. 22 7 With regard specifically to the
International Court of Justice, they worry that expanding its jurisdiction
outside the realm of consent would cause its delicately maintained influ-
ence to collapse under the weight of political opposition. The Court's for-
mal authority, they believe, must be conservatively aligned with the
realities of a global system in which sovereign states continue to hold the
As detailed in Part I, Section III (see supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text) under
the proposal, the requisite nine member majority of the Security Council could secure a
deferral of the Judicial Commission's referral if a case going forward would interfere
with the Council's own efforts or might otherwise be unhelpful to the political resolu-
tion of a conflict.
224. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter provides that "[tihe Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and
security." U.N. Charter art. 39.
225. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides that "[t]he Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter art. 25. Article 48, paragraph 1
provides that "[tihe action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all of the Members
of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine."
U.N. Charter art. 91 para. 1.
226. Article 41 provides that "[tihe Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions." U.N.
Charter art. 41. Article 42 provides that the Security Council may use armed force to
"maintain or restore international peace and security" should it consider that the "mea-
sures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate."
U.N. Charter art. 42.
227. See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1832, 1834 (2002) (arguing that it is possible to make "substantive rules
or review mechanisms too constraining of sovereignty and precipitatel a backlash by
governments").
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ultimate power. 228 But would states actually have the motivation and the
ability to undermine the Court in response to the expansion of the Court's
advisory powers? This is an important question because it goes to the
capability of the international system to develop beyond power politics.
The General Assembly may cut the Gordian Knot to create referral jurisdic-
tion, but would that lead the Court to ruin?
A. The Court's Soft Power
In terms of motivation, at least some states will be unhappy, at least
some of the time, with the Court's exercise of referral jurisdiction. Typi-
cally, states do not appreciate adverse decisions. This is all the more true
when those decisions impact upon matters that states perceive to involve
vital national interests that they have not consented to being adjudicated in
the first place. States, however, have notoriously short memories when it
comes to imperatives of interests. In fact, history tells us that unhappy
subjects of adverse decisions will overcome their hard feelings when they
themselves find it advantageous to resort to the Court.2 2 9
Of course, individual states or even a group of states might find them-
selves more enduringly opposed to a more jurisdictionally ubiquitous
Court that they view as implacably antagonistic to their interests. Pariah
states, whose behavior is fundamentally outside of global norms, would fit
this bill, but so would powerful states who, as the Gordian Knot discussion
suggests, might perceive their advantage to lie more with political muscle
228. Thus, for example, shortly after the Court decided the highly contentious Nica-
ragua case over a strongly voiced American protest that it had not consented to the
Court's jurisdiction (see supra note 95 and infra notes 238-246 and accompanying
text), Jonathan Charney lamented that the Court was not "strong enough to entertain
this type of case," and that the decision "would threaten its institutional underpinnings."
Jonathan Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems
of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 25, at 305; see also Gary L. Scott & Craig
L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 Am. J.
INT'L L. 57, 66 (1987) (asserting that "United States prestige may suffer somewhat" from
its behavior in the Nicaragua case, but the Court "is far more vulnerable to the effects of
defiance of its compulsory jurisdiction and of its judgments."); cf. GILL, supra note 35, at
142 (discussing South Africa's reaction to the Namibia case-see supra notes 150, 160,
169, and 175 and accompanying text-and concluding that it "demonstrates the inher-
ent limitations of the judicial process ... in the absence of the real consent of the parties
concerned").
229. For example, despite considerable anger over its loss in the Nicaragua case, (see
infra notes 238-243 and accompanying text) the United States sought the Court's relief
in an action against Italy only four years later. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S.
v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15 (July 20). This principle of what might be called strategic exi-
gency holds true generally across international institutions. For example, the George W.
Bush administration, stung by the impending refusal of the Security Council to author-
ize its invasion of Iraq, vowed to make the United Nations irrelevant. Less than nine
months later, however, it returned to the Security Council seeking support for Resolu-
tion 1511 legitimizing its post-invasion occupation. SeeJohn F. Burns & Thom Shanker,
U.S. Officials Fashion Legal Basis to Keep Force in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at A10.
If the US could now secure a diplomatically helpful advisory judgment of the Court
regarding Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, its temptation to do so despite any mis-
giving about referral jurisdiction would likewise be extremely strong.
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than judicial process. 230
Understandably, the potential for the Court to garner such powerful
enemies can be intimidating to those concerned with its future well-being.
Despite powerful states' outsized influence in global economic, military,
and diplomatic affairs, they cannot, however, single-handedly or even
jointly cripple the Court. The reason why lies in the nature of the Court's
power, which can be most easily understood with the help of Joseph Nye's
useful application of legitimacy theory.2 3 ' For Nye, political power can
either be based upon legitimacy factors such as the attractiveness of values,
which he calls soft power, 23 2 or upon military and economic might, which
he calls hard power. 233 An institution that employs soft power relies upon
its ability to voluntarily encourage rather than coerce behavior. For exam-
ple, unlike military dictators who may use the threat of violence to enforce
their rule, the power today of most spiritual authorities lies primarily in a
belief among followers in their virtue and the virtue of their message.
The Court's power is soft power. It has no army-not even an army of
bureaucrats-to enforce its decisions, and it has no economic resources
beyond its own small budget. Its only power comes from the international
community's willingness to respect its judgments out of a belief in its
moral authority as a fair and independent tribunal 2 34 of United Nations-
appointed judges of high moral character and recognized competence in
international law 235 representing the main forms of civilization. 236
B. The Power of Soft Power
To undermine the Court's soft power, its foes must somehow reduce
the international community's general acceptance of its moral authority.
As it turns out, hard power tools of military and economic might are not
well adapted to accomplishing this objective.
The use of military force against the Court would be so counter-
productive to state efforts to neutralize the Court's soft power that it is very
difficult even to imagine such an attempt. Such force would actually
increase the visibility and probably the standing of the Court, while doing
230. At least that is the assessment of United States interests one prominent Court
observer came to when she wrote: "it should be frankly acknowledged, [that the Court
plenum] is no longer a hospitable arena for either dispute-settlement or law development
[for the United States]," and that "[i]t is not in the U.S. interest to expose itself to the
possibility of judicial censure nor to have questionable processes of norm-formation
endowed with added force and legitimacy by means of judicial sanction." SUPREME
COURT OF THE NATIONS, supra note 61, at 407.
231. For further discussion of legitimacy theory in international law, particularly as
applied by Thomas Franck, see supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
232. JOSEPH S. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPER-
POWER CAN'T GO IT ALONE 8-9 (2002). For Nye's most recent elaboration of his soft
power theory, see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, THE FUTURE OF POWER (2011); see also JOSEPH
S. NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (2005).
233. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, supra note 232.
234. See supra note 201.
235. See ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art 2.
236. Id. at art. 9.
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more than any adverse advisory opinion to damage the legitimacy of an
attacking state's legal position and general reputation. The use of eco-
nomic coercion is a similar non-starter. A country cannot sever economic
relations with, or use trade sanctions against, a judicial body. Countries
could refuse to contribute financially to the Court, but this would be diffi-
cult as its funding comes through the United Nations general budget2
37
and other countries, if committed, could always make up the difference.
Antagonistic countries might more plausibly attempt to employ their
soft power to counter the Court. They could refuse to appear before the
Court, disregard its decisions, and wage a propaganda assault on the
Court's legitimacy. If history is any guide, however, these three tactics, as
with use of force, are likely to backfire and enhance the credibility of the
Court at the expense of such countries and the legitimacy of their legal
position.
Illustrative of the deficiency of this soft power strategy is the 1986
Nicaragua case2 38 in which the Court ruled that the United States had vio-
lated international law by supporting and engaging in military action
against Nicaragua. 23 9 Unhappy that the Court had taken the case, and
even more unhappy with its eventual holding, the United States employed
all three soft power tactics. First, following acceptance of jurisdiction, the
United States refused to participate in the merits phase of the proceed-
ing240 and even revoked its longstanding agreement to be subject to the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 24 1 Then, after the Court proceeded to
rule against it, the United States refused to comply with the Court's judg-
ment.24 2 Finally, the U.S. waged a propaganda assault on the Court's cred-
ibility, indicative of which were the comments of then-United States United
237. Id. at art. 33.
238. Nicaragua, supra note 95.
239. Id.
240. The United States is not alone in refusing to participate in various phases of
contentious Court cases. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3 (May 24) (Iran refusing to participate in the case); Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.CJ. 3 (Dec. 19) (Turkey refusing to par-
ticipate in the interim measures and jurisdiction phases of the case); Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.CJ. 3 (July 25) (Iceland refusing to participate in the case);
Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 1.C.J. 175 (July 25) (Iceland refusing to par-
ticipate in the case); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 457 (Dec. 20) (France refus-
ing to participate in the case); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (Preliminary
Objection), 1953 I.CJ. 111 (Nov. 18) (Guatemala refusing to participate in the prelimi-
nary objection phase of the case); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Order (Interim
Measures of Protection), 1951 t.CJ 89 (July 5) (Iran refusing to participate in the provi-
sional measures phase of the case); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.CJ. 4
(Apr. 9) (Albania refusing to participate in the case).
241. For further discussion, see supra note 105.
242. Following the Nicaraguan election of the Washington-leaning Chamorro govern-
ment in 1991, the United States and Nicaragua reached a negotiated accommodation.
See Discontinuance by Nicaragua of Case Against the United States, 86 Am. J. INT'L L.
173-74 (1991). For an informative recounting of the Nicaragua litigation story, see
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Nicaragua Case: Preserving World Peace and the World Court,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickenson & MarkJanis eds.,
2007).
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Nations Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick: "The court, quite frankly, is not
what its name suggests, an international court of justice. It's a semi-legal,
semi-juridical, semi-political body which nations sometimes accept and
sometimes don't.
24 3
Many commentators at the time predicted that the Court would be
significantly harmed by the soft power plays of the world's mightiest coun-
try.24 4 Instead, the tribunal's own prominence rose considerably. Most
tellingly, a court that adjudicated fifty-three contentious cases in the forty-
one years prior to delivering the Nicaragua opinion has adjudicated sixty-
eight such cases in the only twenty-four years since that opinion. 24 5 In
contrast, indicative of the damage that the Reagan administration's actions
against the Court did to the reputation of the United States and the legiti-
macy of its legal position, in 1986 the United Nations General Assembly
voted 94 to 3 to rebuke the U.S. for its failure to comply with the Court's
decision. 2 4
6
Soft power strategies are no more likely to be successfully employed by
countries who would today attempt to counter referral jurisdiction. In fact,
because states are neither legally obliged to appear in advisory cases 2 4 7 nor
to comply with advisory judgments,2 48 the spurning of the Court's advi-
sory processes is not a direct challenge to the Court's authority.
C. The International Community and the Court
If states, even powerful states, acting on their own cannot defeat the
Court's soft power, and it is only the international community of states
generally that can withdraw the support that empowers the Court, the
question becomes whether the international community would withdraw
that support in response to referral jurisdiction. Because the Court serves
243. Howard N. Meyer, When the Pope Rebuked the U.S. at the World Court, BALTIMORE
SUN, Mar. 18, 1997, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-03-18/news/
1997077033_1.court-jurisdiction-world-court-nicaragua/2.
244. See supra note 228.
245. This represents an increase in average contentious cases per year from 1.3 prior
to the Nicaragua case to 2.8 after that case. See International Court of Justice, List of
Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction, http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2 (last visited August 1, 2010).
246. G.A. Res. 41/31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/53 (Nov. 3, 1986). The U.S. refusal to
participate in the merits phase of the case may also have been counterproductive to its
interest in influencing the Court's final opinion. See Charney, supra note 228, at 291
("While the Court did take into account unofficial communications from the United
States on the facts and the law, it did so in limited ways. The result appears to be that
the United States view of the case was not adequately considered by the Court and the
resulting adverse findings appear to be an unfortunate product, at least in part, of the
non-participation of the United States in the merits phase of the case.").
247. States are also not legally obligated to appear in contentious cases. See Nuclear
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order (Interim Measures of Protection), 1973 I.CJ. 135, 153 (June
22) (Gros, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no duty for states to appear before the
Court). But see Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Problem of the Non-Appearing Defendant Govern-
ment, in 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89 (1982) (arguing that states do have a legal obligation to
participate in proceedings of the Court).
248. See, e.g., Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 71 (affirming that because the Court's
reply is of an advisory character, "it has no binding force").
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the international community's interests by promoting law compliance and
contributing to dispute resolution, the community will be predisposed to
continue its support so long as the Court does not offend against its
sensibilities.
What then would so offend? To start with, states generally would not
be offended by the mere exercise of non-consensual referral jurisdiction
(as fearful supporters of the Court might assume). After all, the requisite
majority249 of states that voted for referral jurisdiction in the General
Assembly presumably would not turn against the Court for doing what
they authorized it to do, and even many states that voted in the opposition
would accept the appropriateness of the Court exercising jurisdiction in
accord with the Assembly's mandate. More fundamentally, the exercise of
nonconsensual jurisdiction no longer goes against the grain of states'
embedded sense of right order. Of course no state wants to be the unwill-
ing subject of a critical opinion, but in the interest of building a functional
legal system, states in more and more institutional contexts have come to
accept that lack of consent should not be a bar to international jurisdic-
tion. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights employs a
system of advisory jurisdiction almost identical to the one being proposed
in this Article, 2 50 and even compulsory binding jurisdiction is the order of
the day at many of the international system's specialized tribunals.2 5 1
Though states generally will not be inclined to turn against the Court
just for exercising referral jurisdiction, they will have expectations that the
Court will have to meet to maintain its good standing. Those expectations
are the same ones that all communities have for all courts. As institutions
249. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
250. Pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights, a state member of the
Organization of American States may request an advisory opinion regarding any treaty
that concerns the protection of human rights in the Americas. American Convention on
Human Rights art. 64, supra note 8. While in theory the Inter-American Court renders
advisory opinions only on abstract questions of law, in practice it reviews state conduct.
For example, upon the application of Mexico, the Inter-American Court rendered two
advisory judgments concerning practices of the United States (a member of the Organi-
zation of American States but not a party to the American Convention). The first con-
cerned the rights of undocumented workers in foreign countries. See Juridical
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003). The second concerned requirements
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that states inform foreign nationals of
their right to contact their national consulate upon arrest. See The Right to Information
on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law,
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999).
251. The systems of dispute resolution of both the World Trade Organization (for-
merly, the GATT) (see supra note 11) and the European Court of Human Rights (see
supra note 7) evolved from consent-based to compulsory. Other present day compulsory
systems include: the European Union's European Court of Justice (see supra note 12),
the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Court of the European Free Trade Agreement, the
Court of Justice for the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, the Court of
Justice of the Economic Community of West Africa, the Court of Justice of the Andean
Community, the MERCOSUR Permanent Review Tribunal (see supra note 16), the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (see supra note 10). For further
discussion, see Romano, supra note 20, at 803-34.
Cornell International Law Journal
designed to apply systematically abstract legal concepts to concrete cases,
courts are expected to justify their decisions with persuasive legal reason-
ing, be judicially independent and impartial, and not to stray from the nor-
mative and political center of gravity. Whether the Court will competently
justify its legal conclusions and maintain its independence depends upon
an unknown: the future performance of its judges. Certainly, fulfilling
such expectations is well within the capability of the Court's highly compe-
tent bench. That the Court not stray from the normative and political
center of gravity, however, requires some additional explanation.
While international law reflects the norms of the community of states
that prescribes it, in everyday practice that community's identification with
those norms varies with political considerations. There is, however, a
range of legitimate interpretations of the law as well as acceptable options
for adjusting the scope of rulings that allow the Court to avoid issuing
opinions that put it in danger of alienating itself from a critical mass of the
international community. Because of the still common misperception of
law as an exact science, it is important to point out that such strategic
agility does not imply a lack of judicial integrity. Rather, it is a practice
generally understood among sophisticated legal observers as necessary to
maintain core political support. 25 2 As is the case with expectations regard-
ing the quality of the Court's legal reasoning and its independence and
impartiality, the future performance of the Court's judges cannot be pre-
dicted with any certainty. Still, in the past the Court has shown itself quite
adept at maintaining its balance within the normative and political center
of gravity.
If referral jurisdiction is unlikely to cause the community of states to
withdrawal its support, the advent of such jurisdiction actually holds the
promise that the Court's supporting constituency can be expanded to
include the broader global community of citizens. Presently, the Court is
largely a diplomats' court, with most non-foreign policy professionals una-
ware of its existence, much less its jurisprudence. Thrust into the limelight
with greater frequency by a more regular disposition of high profile cases,
the Court could come, as Richard Falk has advocated, to "persuade a non-
professional audience of individuals about global policy that in the Court's
252. That courts do not apply the law in a strictly mechanical way is well accepted
today and has been the focus of a tremendous amount of theoretical scholarship. While
a full discussion of this topic is well beyond the subject matter of this article, for two
classic works of the legal realism school maintaining that there exists a range of legiti-
mate interpretations of the law, see JOHN DEWEY, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS (1941), and Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HAnv. L. REV. 457 (1897). For one of the most well-known works contending that courts
properly account for the general will of the community in their judicial decision-making,
see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962). The International Court of Justice itself is experienced and compe-
tent in making strategic judicial decisions. See, e.g., W.M. Reisman, The Enforcement of
International Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1969) (observing that when states
have been likely to impugn its judgments, the Court has formulated issues restrictively,
issued final judgments "almost Delphic in ambiguity," or "not infrequently disseised
itself of jurisdiction").
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view deserves respect."25 3  The Court would then be institutionally
strengthened as governments who might otherwise be inclined to disregard
it would have the force of citizen opinion to contend with.
Conclusion
In the proceeding pages, I have described how the General Assembly
can cut the Gordian Knot to initiate referral jurisdiction. 1 have also made
the case that the Court's exercise of such jurisdiction would be legal,
would further compliance with international law, and would strengthen,
rather than weaken, the Court. What I have not discussed are the imple-
mentation matters that would need to be addressed if referral jurisdiction
is to become reality. While a thorough examination of implementation
issues is beyond the subject matter of this article, two concerns are of par-
ticular importance and should be briefly mentioned.
The first has to do with the host of issues pertaining to adapting quasi-
contentious cases to the advisory process. While the mechanics of such
adaptation present some complex issues, the Court has already encoun-
tered and developed a template for dealing with them in the five previously
discussed quasi-contentious cases it has decided at the request of the Gen-
eral Assembly or Security Council. 2 54 Based on the Court's Statute and
Rules, which contemplate the Court utilizing contentious procedures to the
extent applicable in quasi-contentious advisory cases, the Court has largely
assimilated such cases into the contentious process.
2 55
The most institutionally challenging adaptation issue raised by refer-
ral jurisdiction is what to do in the event that a relevant party chooses not
to appear. While non-appearance is probably more likely in referral juris-
diction proceedings where acquiescence to jurisdiction is lacking, states in
consent-based contentious cases have at times chosen not to appear. As we
have already observed, the United States did this during the merits phase
of the Nicaragua case.2 56 Despite the challenges it presents, non-appear-
253. RICHARD A. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 191 (1986).
254. See supra notes 149, 151-153 (identifying quasi-contentious cases referred to the
Court by the General Assembly) and supra note 150 (identifying the quasi-contentious
case referred to the Court by the Security Council).
255. Article 68 of the Court's Statute provides that "[in the exercise of its advisory
functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applica-
ble." ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 68. Article 102, paragraph 2 of the Court's Rules
provides that "[t]he Court shall also be guided by the provisions of the Statute and of
these Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to
be applicable. For this purpose, it shall above all consider whether the request for the
advisory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more
States." International Court of Justice, Rules of Court art. 102, para. 2, as amended
Sept. 29, 2005, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p 2 =3&
p3=0.
256. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. refusal to partici-
pate in the merits phase of the Nicaragua case and identifying other instances of states
refusing to participate in proceedings before the Court). See also supra note 247 (docu-
menting that states are not legally obligated to participate in contentious cases).
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ance has never precluded the Court from deciding a case. 257 Article 53 of
the Court's statute provides that a party's failure to appear does not pre-
clude the continuation of proceedings so long as the Court is able to "sat-
isfy itself' that a claim "is well founded in fact and law."258 The Court has
always so satisfied itself, and typically it has done so with the informal
help of non-appearing parties who, despite their non-cooperative postures,
want the Court to understand their positions. 259
The second concern regards institutional capacity. Although referral
jurisdiction has the potential to significantly increase the Court's caseload,
the Court could likely accommodate this increase as it has accommodated
increases in the past. As previously discussed, the Court's docket has
grown significantly in the last quarter century, 260 and the Court has
adapted by employing judicial clerks and introducing several initiatives to
expedite the disposition of cases. 261 If referral jurisdiction made it neces-
sary, a good deal more could be done. 262 To the extent that greater pro-
ductivity depends in particular upon greater resources, provisions for
additional funding could be included in the General Assembly proposal for
referral jurisdiction.2 63
Certainly, there is an upper limit beyond which a bench composed of
fifteen judges cannot be stretched. Given the number of cases that might
plausibly emanate from the Court's relatively small pool of potential state
litigants, referral jurisdiction is unlikely, however, to challenge that limit.
A comparison to national high courts makes this clear. The Court cur-
rently has seventeen pending cases on its docket. Meanwhile, the United
States Supreme Court issues formal signed opinions in about 80 cases a
257. See generally GILL, supra note 35, at 78-79.
258. Article 53, paragraph 1 provides that "[w]henever one of the parties does not
appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the
Court to decide in favour of its claim." Article 53, paragraph 2 provides that "It]he
Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance
with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." ICJ
Statute, supra note 23. The Court has made it clear that it would decline to accept an
advisory case in which it believed that a lack of cooperation from relevant states would
preclude it from ascertaining the necessary information to make a proper decision. See,
e.g., Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 161-62.
259. See GILL, supra note 35, at 78-79.
260. See supra notes 22, 245 and accompanying text.
261. See generally GILL, supra note 35, at 21-22 (discussing the implementation of
recommendations designed to streamline pleadings, oral arguments, and Court delibera-
tions relating to preliminary objections).
262. See generally Report of the Study Group (composed of Professors Bowett and Craw-
ford and Sir Ian Sinclair and Sir Arthur Watts) established by the British Institute of Inter-
national and Comparative Law as a Contribution to the U.N. Decade of International Law,
in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JU TIcE, PROCESS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 27-84
(Derek Bowett et al. eds., 1997) (suggesting ways in which the Court could deal with a
larger caseload).
263. United Nations funding of the Court has increased moderately in recent years.
Nevertheless, as presidents of the Court have repeatedly emphasized in their annual
addresses to the General Assembly the resources available to the Court have been
extremely modest compared to national high courts. See generally GILL, supra note 35, at
241.
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year, and that number has been far higher in the past.2 64 Other national
high courts exhibit similar figures for cases heard annually, and the
famously overstretched European Court of Human Rights has thousands of
cases pending.265
If the Court did reach its absolute limit, it could use its Article 65
discretion to turn cases away, but the hope would be that the international
community would respond with sufficient judicial-capacity building before
that became necessary. In the final analysis, Stephen Schwebel most likely
got it correct when he wrote as a judge on the Court that "like other human
institutions, the Court is responsive to demands made upon it. Should
more cases be submitted to it, it is doubtless that the Court would rise to
the challenge of dealing with them." 26 6
The advent of referral jurisdiction would require working through
many other implementation questions. None are without answers, how-
ever, and the effort would be well rewarded because expanding the jurisdic-
tion of the Court would be an important advance towards a more law-based
international system. The Court, however, is only one component of that
system. In the absence of overarching, system-wide reform, achieving a
global order where law reigns supreme would require a range of comple-
mentary initiatives.
Conceptualizing such initiatives provides an agenda for future aca-
demic research. This research should examine how these initiatives could
best be accomplished. For example, how can the Gordian Knot be cut to
unleash reform? The strategy I suggest of the General Assembly establish-
ing a Judicial Commission only applies to universalizing the Court's advi-
sory jurisdiction. Other initiatives would require their own particular
solutions to the Gordian Knot problem. And, of course, despite the inclina-
tion of the powerful to reinforce the status quo, not every barrier to achiev-
ing rule of law reform is one of great power opposition. Thus, part of the
strategic thinking that needs to be done is to identify strategies that can
enjoy the support of the most powerful countries.
Research on complimentary initiatives should also work through the
systemic implications of suggested reforms. As we have seen to be the case
with referral jurisdiction, independent changes to specific governance
institutions can impact the global system as a whole. The nature of this
impact is often not straightforward. At this point in history, a global order
that is partially based on raw power politics and partially based on rule of
264. See Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.
html?pagewanted=2. The comparison to national high courts is not perfect. Unlike
national high courts, issues of fact do come before the Court, lengthening its proceed-
ings. These proceedings, however, are quite streamlined and should not be confused
with the kinds of full trials that would be familiar in national trial courts.
265. See E. Andrew Drzemczewski, Remarks at the American University, Washington
College of Law Conference: Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-
Regional Agenda (Oct. 20, 2008), in 59 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 247 (2009).
266. Stephen Schwebel, Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court,
33 CATH. U. L. REV. 355 (1984).
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law introduces contradictions and anomalies that must be unraveled.
Once unraveled, navigating these contradictions, as we did in giving the
Security Council the ability to interfere in the judicial referral process, is
necessary to the viability of reform proposals.
All of the above suggests a challenging research agenda. Conceptualiz-
ing reform, however, is only the first step towards implementation. To be
realized, all reform requires political initiative. The proposal for referral
jurisdiction awaits such an initiative, and the changing dynamics of the
global system are encouraging that one could be successful. The world
today is becoming increasingly multipolar,267 and the emergence of newly
industrializing countries such as Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, and South
Africa as able and potentially willing to spearhead such a project 268
portends new possibilities for cutting the Gordian Knot and, in the process,
unleashing a promising era of global rule of law reform.
267. For a discussion of the trend towards multipolarity, see generally FAREED ZAKARIA,
THE POST-AMERICA WORLD (2008).
268. See Stewart Patrick, Irresponsible Stakeholders?: The Difficulty of Integrating Ris-
ing Powers, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 44 (chronicling the rise of newly assertive
non-western powers).
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